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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Kybertoimintaympäristön ilmiöt, erityisesti yksityisyyteen ja turvallisuuteen kohdistuvat 
uhat, ovat laajasti julkisuudessa käsitelty aihe sekä Suomessa että kansainvälisesti. 
Kybertiedustelusta on kuitenkin laadittu vain vähän tutkimusta. 
Opinnäytetyön päätutkimuskysymyksenä oli: missä määrin kybertiedustelumenetelmien 
käyttökelpoisuus on tilanneriippuvaista? 
Tutkimus toteutettiin käyttäen laajalti kirjallisuuslähteitä itse kybertiedustelun käsitteen 
määrittämiseen ja siihen vaikuttavien lainalaisuuksien tunnistamiseen. Näkökulmaa 
kehitettiin edelleen 15 asiantuntijahaastattelulla, jonka jälkeen kybertiedustelun menetelmistä 
muodostettiin hierarkkinen malli. Haastatelluista neljä vastasi mallin perusteelta luotuun 
AHP-kyselyyn. 
Tutkimuksessa päädyttiin siihen johtopäätökseen, että kybertiedustelu on kaikkia 
tavanomaisia tiedustelun lajeja poikkileikkaava tiedustelun ala, jolla on paljon erityispiirteitä 
suhteessa muihin tiedustelun lajeihin. Päätutkimuskysymykseen tehtiin johtopäätös että 
kybertiedustelumenetelmien käytettävyys riippuu olosuhteista osin. 
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ABSTRACT 
Phenomena in cyber domain, especially threats to security and privacy, have proven an 
increasingly heated topic addressed by different writers and scholars at an increasing pace – 
both nationally and internationally. However little public research has been done on the 
subject of cyber intelligence. The main research question of the thesis was: To what extent is 
the applicability of cyber intelligence acquisition methods circumstantial? The study was 
conducted in sequential a manner, starting with defining the concept of intelligence in cyber 
domain and identifying its key attributes, followed by identifying the range of intelligence 
methods in cyber domain, criteria influencing their applicability, and types of operatives 
utilizing cyber intelligence. The methods and criteria were refined into a hierarchical model. 
The existing conceptions of cyber intelligence were mapped through an extensive literature 
study on a wide variety of sources. The established understanding was further developed 
through 15 semi-structured interviews with experts of different backgrounds, whose wide 
range of points of view proved to substantially enhance the perspective on the subject. Four 
of the interviewed experts participated in a relatively extensive survey based on the 
constructed hierarchical model on cyber intelligence that was formulated in to an AHP 
hierarchy and executed in the Expert Choice Comparion online application. It was concluded 
that Intelligence in cyber domain is an endorsing, cross-cutting intelligence discipline that 
adds value to all aspects of conventional intelligence and furthermore that it bears a 
substantial amount of characteristic traits – both advantageous and disadvantageous – and 
furthermore that the applicability of cyber intelligence methods is partly circumstantially 
limited. 
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INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION METHODS IN CYBER DOMAIN 
Examining the Circumstantial Applicability of Cyber Intelligence 
Acquisition Methods Using a Hierarchical Model 
1  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Foreword 
The rapid technological advancement of the latest century, let alone the latest decades has 
fundamentally transformed everyday lives in ways that in retrospect seemed 
incomprehensible. The gap between sci-fi and reality has narrowed, as new technology has 
increasingly proven to bedazzle people in ways earlier only wildest fiction could. 
Consequently, the relationship not only to communication, but information itself has 
transformed: new technology – high-speed wireless Internet, social networking, internet 
telephony, e-mail, cloud services etc. – enables one to carry and access all of his/hers personal 
data virtually everywhere, having uploaded it to the cloud and utilizing a smartphone with 
required data connections, and connect with practically anyone in the world for no price at all. 
Many argue that this development has made life easier and both work and personal life more 
flexible. On the other hand, however, it has made man reliant on ancillaries and his private 
data vulnerable for exploitation – willfully, albeit not comprehending the implications. 
Phenomena associated with the digital realm of cyber domain have proven both inspiring and 
controversial. ‘Cyber’ phenomena – especially nasty-sounding military and criminal 
implications such as cyber espionage, cyber warfare, cyber theft, cyber terrorism etc. – has 
just begun to be comprehended by the masses. Nevertheless, “cyber is inevitably bec[oming] 
the fifth war domain after land, sea, air and space” [144]. Furthermore, implications of threats 
in cyber domain can easily be appreciated in governmental, military or industrial context, but 
the understanding of the real-life implications of actions in cyberspace is not considered to be 
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of much personal importance. One commonly weighs ease and comfort of modern technology 
applications over trouble and awkwardness non-customary security measures bring, self-
deceivingly not thinking one’s personal data would be of any interest to anyone. 
From an authoritative (military, police, government etc.) perspective, the cyber domain 
appears as a vast medium of both new opportunities and trouble. On one hand, the assisting, 
work-facilitating and expediting qualities observed in personal applications translate to 
professional ones as well – even more meaningfully than in recreational context – but on the 
other hand cyber vulnerabilities are fundamentally more difficult to identify let alone to 
protect or eliminate than real-life ones. Furthermore, exploitation of them is often hard to 
detect and skillful perpetrators virtually impossible to identify, but the effects of actions in 
cyberspace “will affect us every day more physically than virtually” [144]. 
When perceiving from a cyber-security point of view, “cyber espionage, theft of intellectual 
property, and a wide variety of criminal activities in cyberspace pose real and serious threats 
to all states, as well as to corporations and private individuals” [128, p. 4]. On the other hand, 
from an intelligence point of view the emergence of cyber domain as a growing global 
medium for a wide variety and vast amount of activities has brought forth a completely new 
and unforeseen set of opportunities – not only does it render physical proximity a negligible 
factor, it provides fundamentally novel ways of intelligence acquisition. 
In military terms, “intelligence assists the commander in visualizing his battlespace, 
organizing his forces, and controlling operations to achieve the desired tactical objectives or 
end-state. […] The most important purpose of intelligence is to influence decisionmaking. 
Commanders must receive the intelligence, understand it (because it is tailored to the 
commander’s requirements), believe it, and act on it. Through this doctrinal concept, 
intelligence drives operations.” [17] The dual purpose of intelligence – military and otherwise 
– is to stay informed in order to be able to carry out analysis when needed and serve as a 
continuous source of balanced, verified information enlightened decision-making needs. Until 
recently, almost all branches of intelligence have been founded on primary observations made 
of real-world objects based on real-word indicators (visual, sound, electromagnetic etc.) and 
secondary observations of recordings (written form, photos etc.) of the former. Adding the 
cyber intelligence into the picture, only little imagination is required to fathom the dramatic 
increase in resources it brings to all-source intelligence. 
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1.2  A Brief History of Intelligence in Cyber Domain 
Whereas other forms of intelligence are conducted in real world, characteristic to cyber 
intelligence – like other ‘cyber’-phenomena – is that it by definition requires the man-made 
environment of interconnected computer systems [97]. Intelligence has been a crucial to 
mankind ever since the earliest humans began to process information and have drawn 
conclusions influence everyday decisions. Furthermore, computers have been utilized for 
intelligence purposes ever since the construction of Colossus Mark 1, operational by January 
1944 [71], that was “the world's first semi-programmable electronic computer” [53]. 
However, the first concept and infrastructure that would suffice for a cyber domain was the 
ARPANET, that initially in late 1969 comprised four host computers that were connected 
together [101], and through gradual developments grew into the Internet [101]. Until year 
1990, the Internet was a network of a limited community – science and defense. In late 1989, 
Tim Berners-Lee documented what was to become the World Wide Web (WWW) and in 
1993, CERN made it available on a royalty-free basis. [27] 
With much of the cyber intelligence methodology building upon hacking – especially when 
perceiving intelligence as a general phenomenon – the origins of intelligence acquisition in 
cyber domain can be traced to MIT’s computer-enthusiasts of 1960’s. The earliest hacks were 
“simply shortcuts developed to bypass or improve the operation of systems” [21], meaning in 
essence finding and exploiting vulnerabilities in the systems. The introduction of ‘personal’ 
computers in the 1980’s was a turning point in hacker history, because computers became 
available to anyone for their own purposes, as opposed to being limited to hardcore hobbyists 
and business users. Modems were also more widely available and significantly extended the 
hacker’s reach [67], enabling the use of for example BBS systems (invented in 1978) [23; 
124], IRC (invented in 1988) [32] for communicating. The latter is still perhaps the most 
popular means of communication in the hacker community [83]. 
The first publicly known case of cyber domain facilitated intelligence – or espionage – was 
discovered in the late 1980’s: Clifford Stoll, computer administrator at Berkeley, received an 
“apparently mundane job of tracking down an accounting discrepancy on the LBL computers” 
[98], which eventually lead to him uncovering a KGB spy ring based in West Germany. The 
craker, Marcus Hess, had compromised the security of the university’s computer network and 
had used it as an access point to a vast number of government, military and defense industry 
networks, and exploited the situation by passing sensitive information on to the KGB. Hess 
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was tried and convicted in 1989. [56, p. 97; 98] Now, “it’s estimated that 30,000 websites are 
hacked every single day, ranging from small company blogs to social media behemoths” [21]. 
Another central component in the cyber intelligence toolbox is malware. Much like hacking, 
for a long time malware was a phenomenon causing nuisance rather than compromising 
confidentiality, but the core nature of software being deliberately created for malicious 
purposes has been present from the emergence of first malware. First malware, the ‘Creeper 
Virus’, was created in 1971. The first Trojan, ANIMAL, was released in 1978, and the first 
virus, the ‘Elk Cloner’, in 1981. These did not, however, amount to causing damage to 
computer systems. [24] The first destructive virus to have a global impact was the Jerusalem 
virus released in 1987 [16], and since then, computer malware has explosively evolved in 
complexity, finesse, severity, number, and impact – financial as well as security. Until 1999, 
however, computer malware did not pose a threat to confidentiality of data. First occurrence 
of spyware took place in 1999, when Elf Bowling and other seemingly harmless leisure were 
discovered to be reporting user data back to their developers [25; 26], consequently also 
raising an issue of inadequateness of existing legislation to address the problem [70]. 
Interestingly, some of the code of Regin, a multi-staged, modular threat remote access Trojan 
(RAT) [5] discovered in 2014 and suspected to have been used for spying purposes by 
government entities [143], has been found to date back to 1999 [110]. The first malware 
incident F-Secure assessed to be involved in state-sponsored cyber espionage took place in 
2003 [81]. 
Originally denoting exclusively nation-state level cyber espionage [3] and still assessed to 
being mainly within reach of only nations, the concept of advanced persistent threat (APT) 
was first coined in the US Air Force 2006, defining something fundamentally different from 
‘ordinary’ cyber espionage that typically relies on mass-exploitation of vulnerabilities: 
targeted, long-lasting, low-profile cyber espionage that incorporates multiple methods [49]. 
Typically to espionage-related phenomena that is veiled with secrecy, APT actors are assessed 
to have been around much before their public discovery: for example, Equation group, a 
sophisticated APT actor, has been active since 2001, perhaps even since 1996 [13]. 
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Later on, cyber espionage incidents have been discovered at a growing rate. In 2011, a trojan 
named Duqu that is believed to be designed to gather intelligence from industrial control-
systems was discovered [12], and soon discovered to have many similarities with the 
infamous Stuxnet  [57]. In 2013, Red October, a large scale cyber-espionage network that 
targeted mainly Eastern-European and Central-Asian diplomatic service agencies, was 
discovered in 2013 and suspected to have been active since 2007 [42]. The same year, Edward 
Snowden, a former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor acquired up to 200,000 
classified documents, fled to Hong Kong and handed them over to journalists of The 
Guardian [93; 119], which after a vast amount of documents have been published. The 
documents have unveiled numerous, massive surveillance programs on online 
communication, run by many government agencies, most prominently the NSA and QCHQ1. 
Reported surveillance methods used range from back door access to Google, Apple, Facebook 
and other databases, tapping fiber optic communication cables, circumventing encryption 
technologies, intercepting phone calls, diverting and modifying computers en route to 
customer… [76; 88; 93; 104] 
To date, cyber espionage – or intelligence – has emerged as an increasingly potent and 
especially reaching intelligence gathering discipline. Whereas most ‘traditional’ intelligence 
methods are strongly sanctioned and thus within reach of only those with jurisdiction, many 
cyber intelligence acquisition methods have proven to be within reach of virtually anyone 
with the mere will to exploit them, given of course the capacity to learn and utilize the tools 
available. Albeit laws do condemn infringements of confidentiality, in cyber domain even 
noticing encroaching on confidential information, let alone identifying the perpetrator, can be 
beyond reach of any surveillance, and in case of discovery laws may be incapable of 
combating the threat [114]. Thus far – over a period of mere decades – a wide, almost 
incomprehensible range of methods of intelligence acquisition in cyber domain has been 
discovered – and yet there is something new and unforeseen to come [92]. 
  
  
                                                 
1 Government Communications Headquarters 
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1.3  Existing Research on Cyber Intelligence 
Phenomena in cyber domain, especially threats to security and privacy, have proven an 
increasingly heated topic addressed by different writers and scholars at an increasing pace – 
both nationally and internationally. Approach angles and points of view of existing research 
and literature on cyber phenomena fall mainly into one of two categories: cyber security and 
cyber offensive. From these two perspectives, the role and manifestation of intelligence differ 
fundamentally. In the former, cyber intelligence is perceived from a threat awareness and 
vulnerability management perspective, whereas in the latter, cyber intelligence – or 
intelligence in general – is treated as an enabling and target designating element. 
Cyber intelligence per se, however, is directly less covered in existing literature and research. 
Most writers discuss intelligence – or reconnaissance or espionage – as an interphase of a 
greater process or from a narrower point of view. Albeit cyber phenomena has been 
extensively – perhaps even overwhelmingly – discussed in literature, intelligence in cyber 
domain has not been addressed comprehensively as a phenomenon of its own. Consequently, 
the definition of intelligence in cyber domain as well as its attributes – scope, methodology, 
strengths and shortcomings – call for in-depth scrutiny. 
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1.4  Framework and Research Problem 
Defining cyber warfare is far from a straightforward task. It can even be argued that 
“definitions for Cyber and Warfare are both under debate” [55, p. 3]. Furthermore, 
intelligence in cyberspace does not quite fall neatly into any one notch, either. Both for this 
reason and because little research has been targeted specifically at cyber intelligence, the 
selected approach of this study is to address the very concept of intelligence in cyber domain, 
and further analyze how cyber intelligence acquisition methods apply in different 
circumstances. 
The primary research question of the study is: 
• To what extent is the applicability of cyber intelligence acquisition methods 
circumstantial? 
The primary research question may be broken down to sub-questions: 
• What constitutes as intelligence in cyber domain?  
• What is the scope of cyber intelligence? 
• What is the range of intelligence methods in cyber domain? 
• What factors dictate the applicability of intelligence methods in cyber domain? 
• What is the range of cyber intelligence operatives?
• How can the applicability of cyber intelligence acquisition methods be assessed? 
The research questions will be addressed by establishing a theoretical base from a 
comprehensive set of literature, amending the point of view with experts’ understanding of 
the field. Furthermore, a hierarchical model of intelligence in cyber domain is created and 
applied, aimed at untangling the circumstantial dependence of applicability of intelligence 
methods in cyber domain. 
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1.5  Perspective, Scope and Exclusions 
Although the intention of this study is not to focus exclusively on military intelligence, it is 
convenient to derive the definition of intelligence in cyberspace from the framework of cyber 
warfare, among other designated frameworks in the cyber domain. Many aspects of 
intelligence – and hence of cyber intelligence – are primarily defined through military 
functions, but when expanding the point of view to other aspects of life, the corresponding 
non-military implications are derivable. 
The perspective of the study is to examine the concept of intelligence in cyber domain in a 
general and universal manner, aiming at developing a functional model and sound framework 
for analyzing intelligence in cyber context as a whole.  The concepts of both intelligence  and 
activities in cyberspace are addressed in such a manner that artificial categorizations or 
technicalities do not rule out any ground. In-depth and detail analysis of various methods for 
extracting exploitable information by cyber means will be excluded from the study, because 
such detailed accounts would both draw attention from developing a more general 
understanding of phenomena constituting intelligence methods in cyber domain and – more 
importantly – not provide but a narrow and pale representation of the vast variety of 
intelligence collection possibilities facilitated by current cyber potential. 
In this study, the concept of intelligence is treated as a discipline of collecting information 
required for decision making, planning, situational awareness etc. – intelligence is treated as a 
proactive and exploratory discipline. Hence, in the framework of this study, cyber security as 
well as preventive and reactive intelligence activities are excluded, for example cyber security 
intelligence and cyber forensics. 
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1.6  Key Definitions 
Cyber 
The word ‘cyber’ is usually used as “the prefix for a term or the modifier of a compound 
word.”  In vernacular, however, the word occasionally appears by itself. ‘Cyber’ usually 
implies being related “to electronic information (data) processing, information technology, 
electronic communications (data transfer) or information and computer systems.” [15]  
Cyber domain 
By technical definition, ‘cyber domain’ refers to “an electronic information (data) processing 
domain comprising of one or several information technology infrastructures” [15]. In this 
thesis, the term is understood to encompass the logical IT environment and the IT 
infrastructure including interfaces to the physical world. 
Hacker and hacking 
In everyday language, the word hacker is often used to refer to individuals who gain illegal 
access to computer systems for malicious purposes, namely to steal, tamper with or corrupt 
information [20; 19], although it is argued that the proper term for such individuals is cracker 
[20]. In this study, the word ‘hacking’ will be used when referring to gaining unauthorized 
access to computer systems and networks, and the word ‘hacker’ when referring to persons 
conducting such activity. 
Intelligence 
In this study, the word ‘intelligence’ is understood as collection, processing and exploitation 
of information with respect to operative’s objectives and requirements. The word is used as a 
hypernym that comprises activities of different levels and scales (intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance etc.) and is not demarcated by legal or jurisdicial considerations 
(encompassing legitimate intelligence activities as well as espionage, snooping, etc.), nor by 
organizational or geographical factors. 
Malware 
Malware, or malicious software, refers to software dedicated and designated to perform 
unwanted actions on computer systems [36]. 
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Metadata 
“Metadata is data about data” [55, p. 109], meaning content associated to the payload 
information. For example, a digital photograph contains at least file name and size, 
permissions, timestamps (date created, date modified) and possibly much more, such as date 
taken, place taken, camera and lens used, exposure configuration, copyright etc.  
Vulnerability 
A vulnerability is a weakness of an asset or control that can be exploited by a threat [44]. 
From an information technology perspective, vulnerabilities may be identified in following 
areas: organization, processes and procedures, management routines, personnel, physical 
environment, information system configuration, hardware, software or communications 
equipment, or dependence on external parties [45]. 
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2  METHODOLOGY 
2.1  Methodological Framework and Conduct of the Research 
Given the fact that the conceptual framework of phenomena and activities in cyber domain is 
still forming and substantially dependent on chosen point of view, the initial research setting 
is to synthesize a neutral conceptual framework for intelligence in cyber domain that 
perceives the phenomenon namely from the point of view of conducting intelligence 
activities. Having established the conceptual framework, the topic is further developed to 
defining the elements composing the entity of intelligence in cyber domain – namely 
intelligence methods – and its characteristic attributes. Furthermore, the defined elements and 
attributes are developed into a hierarchical model for quantitative analysis of intelligence in 
cyber domain, and the obtained quantitative data is analyzed with the qualitative attributes of 
the phenomenon, drawing conclusions on the circumstantial applicability of intelligence 
methods in cyber domain. Structure of the research and thesis is illustrated in Figure 1 below: 
Figure 1 Structure of the Research and Thesis 
To accomplish the described research construction, both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods are utilized. The motivation for combining different methods is that they have 
different strengths [109, p. 1], and through incorporating multiple approach angles to the 
controversial topic at hand, a both more balanced and more insightful conception on the 
subject. The pursued purpose for integrating qualitative and quantitative methods is ultimately 
convergent, meaning that both kinds of methods are used to examine the research question 
[109, p. 11], providing a basis for contrasting the outcomes of qualitative and quantitative 
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methods. However, for the purposes of establishing the preconditions for quantitative research 
of deductive, objective and general nature, qualitative research of the inductive and contextual 
qualities is incorporated in a sequential manner [109, pp. 9–10]. 
2.2  Research Methods 
The conceptual framework of the research is initially established based on comprehensive 
literature review of existing research and literature. The conceptual perspective is refined with 
interviews with experts. Furthermore, literature and interviews are used to define the 
acquisition methods and characterizing attributes of intelligence in cyber domain. After this, a 
hierarchical model of intelligence in cyber domain is formulated into an AHP hierarchy, 
which is evaluated by persons interviewed earlier. The quantitative data of the AHP survey is 
analyzed and contrasted with the qualitative data of the earlier stages of the research. 
2.2.1  Literature Review 
For the purposes of founding the empirical elements of the research on sufficient basis as well 
as contrasting the empirical data with prior conceptions, a literature review is conducted. 
Furthermore, it serves the purpose of clarifying the research question and approach, resulting 
in a more appropriate and definite empirical approach. [137, p. 42]  
“Cultivating a reference list that presents a variety of positions on the topic is essential so as 
not to present a distorted view of the state of the field” [118, p. 51]. For the purposes of 
avoiding the bias of a needlessly narrow perspective, publications of related disciplines are 
incorporated, because “several disciplines are working on related problems, so analyzing and 
critiquing those intersections can be valuable” [118, p. 51]. A number of fields conduct 
research that is associated with aspects of cyber intelligence, of these security and military 
studies being perhaps most prominent, however also many others touch upon the subject. 
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2.2.2  Interview 
The research interview is essentially about asking purposeful questions and carefully listening 
to the answers to be able to explore these further [127, p. 372], and it was utilized in the study 
for the purpose of refining conceptions derived from literary sources. The selection of 
interviewees of the study encompasses a wide selection of persons whose fields perceive 
cyber phenomena from different perspectives, hence allowing for acquiring a variety of 
opinions on the field of cyber intelligence. Brief descriptions and assessments of the 
interviewees can be found in Annex 1.  
Semi-structured – or qualitative – research interview was used because it allows for structure 
in terms of themes or questions to be covered during the session, but their use may vary from 
interview to another [127, pp. 374–375], thus allowing for discussion to proceed more freely. 
Hence, the interviewees were allowed to present their opinions on the questions and themes 
presented to them to the extent they desired, and the interviewer to present additional and 
more detailed questions that arose during the sessions. The thematic questions for the 
interviews can be found in Annex 2. The interviews were conducted in person, and the 
sessions were recorded. 
2.2.3  AHP 
AHP is a decision support tool which can be utilized to solve complex decision problems, 
using a multi-level hierarchical structure of objectives, criteria, subcriteria, and alternatives 
[135]. In the framework of the study, the AHP was applied to analyze the relative 
applicability of different cyber intelligence methods in given circumstances. The objective 
and framework were set by scenarios, with respect to which assessments were made. Three 
distinct scenarios were established in order to contrast the intelligence methods in different 
settings. The principle of application of AHP in the study is illustrated in Figure 2 below: 
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Figure 2 Principle of Application of AHP in the Research 
A multi-level, hierarchical model was established based on the identified cyber intelligence 
methods and criteria dictating their applicability. The intelligence methods were treated as the 
alternatives of the hierarchy, and the criteria were grouped as sub-criteria of three main 
criteria. The identified intelligence methods and assessment criteria as well as the detailed 
composition of the hierarchy used are addressed in depth in Chapter 5. An example of a 
simple AHP hierarchy is depicted in Figure 3 below:
Figure 3 Example of AHP Hierarchy 
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The principle of the AHP calculation is in essence “to construct a matrix expressing the 
relative values of a set of attributes,” i.e. which attribute is most important and which least 
important in relation to the others. These judgments are assigned numeric values on a selected 
scale. [69] In the typical use of AHP, the “pertinent data are derived by using a set of pairwise 
comparisons. These comparisons are used to obtain the weights of importance of the decision 
criteria, and the relative performance measures of the alternatives in terms of each individual 
decision criterion” [135], illustrated in Figure 3. In this study, however, pairwise comparison 
was not used in order to avoid an overwhelmingly lengthy survey. Criteria were weighed in 
terms of direct priority assignment, and alternatives were assessed on a rating scale [8]. 
Details about how the survey for collecting the AHP data was constructed is further discussed 
in Chapter 5, and analysis of the data is conducted in Chapter 6. 
2.3  Source Criticism 
2.3.1  Literature 
For the study, a wide range of primary, secondary and tertiary literary sources are utilized. 
The literary base of the thesis is wide, however the sources are exclusively non-classified, 
which can be considered a limitation because intelligence-related information is most often 
classified. Non-public research and publications undoubtedly exist, but for the purposes of 
keeping the thesis’ security classification intact, such sources have not been pursued. 
In the context of this study, the wide variety of literary sources is on one hand a limitation 
because the validity and reliability can be difficult to judge in certain cases, but on another 
hand contrasting information from different sources allows to find congruencies as well as 
dissonance between them, allowing then to analyze possible causes for discrepancies. 
Contrasting various literary sources against experts’ views is another potent way of evaluating 
validity and reliability of sources. 
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2.3.2  Interviewees 
The interviewees represent a wide selection of experts in their respective fields, providing a 
multitude of perspectives to the concept of cyber intelligence. The approach to the research is 
general and conceptual, and the topic inclined to strong opinions, which suggests that the 
expressed expert views might be divergent and contradicting in some respects. 
2.3.3  AHP 
AHP is deemed to be applicable to “any complex situation that requires structuring, 
measurement, and and/or synthesis is a good candidate for AHP. However, AHP is rarely 
used in isolation. Rather, it is used along with, or in support of other methodologies” [74]. In 
this study, AHP is used along with literary review and interviews. 
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3  INTELLIGENCE IN DECISION-MAKING 
By and large, most words bear multiple meanings [54], and conceptions associated with  
‘intelligence’ in the context of this study is no exception. Conceptual ambiguity and 
contradiction exists for example regarding the relation between words ‘intelligence’ and 
‘espionage,’ and the latter in general bears a strong implication of government-related 
collection of information [115; 136]. Even though the terminological ambiguity is dismissed 
in this study by picking the word ‘intelligence’ to be used as a hypernym, an examination of 
the conceptual relation between intelligence and decision-making is called for before 
approaching the concept of cyber intelligence. 
3.1  Intelligence as a Discipline 
From a state point of view, “the core responsibility of intelligence as a discipline is to provide 
state leadership with insight into what the emerging threats are before they manifest into an 
attack on a state” [65]. In military context it even can be perceived that it “drives the conduct 
of operations” [18, p. 1-4]. For the purposes of a more general inquiry one needs, however, to 
expand the definition of the concept of intelligence – the utilization of intelligence is not by 
any means confined to military or state applications. Intelligence “is itself a dynamic concept 
that does not have just one definition or application. […] [T]he ultimate purpose of the 
intelligence product is simple: provide an edge to the decision-maker. Intelligence is many 
things, but foundationally, its core mission is to provide knowledge of the world in which we 
live” [84, p. 2].  
From an information security perspective, the nature of intelligence can be argued to be 
associated to violating one element of the CIA2 triad: confidentiality [115]. In many respects, 
a breach in confidentiality – acquisition of information that can be considered sensitive or 
private [66] – might not extend to legal or even moral discrepancies. For example, if the target 
is misguidedly forthcoming with respect to sensitive information, the intelligence is in 
essence open-source but nevertheless provides intimate insight into the subject in question. 
An illustration of the CIA triad is displayed in Figure 4 below. 
                                                 
2 Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability 
18 
Figure 4 CIA Triad [62] 
When it comes to formulating a more specific definition, “each expert tends to view the term 
through the spectacles of his specialty” [58]. Much effort has been made in order to formulate 
satisfactory definitions of intelligence for respective circumstances, not least for legislative 
and jurisdictive purposes [113] as well as for purposes of describing its purpose, role and 
impact in organizations [2; 17]. Many definitions, however, tend to be either too general in 
nature for practical uses or excessively restrictive and narrow in order to cover the concept in 
general. In order to facilitate a starting point for assessing cyber intelligence, one needs to 
deduce a satisfactorily general and simultaneously specific enough definition for intelligence. 
Albeit objectives, methods and motives vary, the key elements of intelligence stand universal: 
planning and direction of intelligence functions, collection, processing, analyzing and 
production of information into a final product, and dissemination of the end product 
appropriately [86]. As discussed further on, these elements – or intelligence in general – 
should be understood as a cognitive process applicable to any activity instead of being strictly 
limited to for example military activity.  
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3.2  Intelligence as an Element in Decision-making 
As stated afore, the core nature of intelligence is to serve the purpose of providing those who 
make decisions and draw plans with appropriate insight. In order to understand the role of 
intelligence in human activity, one needs to turn attention to how the process of carrying out 
intelligence coalesces into the overall process of making decisions. Albeit much of the 
vocabulary used when referring to intelligence of most kinds is expressed in words commonly 
associated to military activities, the discourse shall not be mistaken as being confined to a 
military framework. On a conceptual level, most of the principles translate, scale and are 
applicable to other frameworks. 
3.2.1  The OODA Cycle 
In contemporary discourse on C2, Boyd’s OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) cycle is 
clearly the dominant model referred to in every self-respecting briefing on C2 issues [61]. In 
essence, it is a concept that represents a cognitive decision-making process from observation 
to action. Originally, it was promulgated as an attempt to explain American fighter pilots’ 
superior success rate over their adversaries in the Korean war – the analysis was that the 
superiority was due to the capability of performing decision-making cycles faster than their 
opponents [61]. Typically, the model is represented as a closed loop, portrayed on the left in 
Figure 5 below, whereas the entity of Boyd’s model is better represented in the workflow-like 
process diagram on the right. 
Figure 5 The OODA Cycle [61] 
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The simple, orbicular Byodian OODA-loop has been challenged for many reasons, not least 
for its simplicity. In land warfare, for example, it is argued that decision-making is a much 
more complex process – observations, situational aspects and angles, decisions and actions 
are argued to be convoluted, contrary to hands-on situations like dogfighting. [120] 
Notwithstanding critique and despite its simplicity, Boyd’s OODA-loop is a sound model for 
decision-making – from individual to organizational level, provided that it is considered as a 
base model and mindset to build up from rather than a constraining checklist. 
When applying the model to real-life C2 situations one comes to realize that the process 
involves much more than plainly decision-making itself – it is not simply an abstract 
phenomenon, but involves qualities (limitations and constraints as well as potential and 
assets) of the persons and apparatus involved. Boyd himself refined the original model over 
years, and other scholars have also made attempts to formulate more tangible decision making 
models: Lawson’s model, Wohl’s SHOR model, Brehmer’s Dynamic Decision Model of C2 
and DOODA-model, to mention a few. [61] While chosen terminology and angle of approach 
vary, all models incorporate the fundamental concept of incorporation of new information and 
adaptation to it.  
3.2.2  The Intelligence Cycle 
In deliberate, objective-driven activities, intelligence is the process aimed at producing the 
required information and analysis of the situation and elements. Typically – or maybe rather 
traditionally – intelligence has been described through a circular model not much unlike the 
OODA-loop: “the intelligence cycle is the process of developing unrefined data into polished 
intelligence for the use of policymakers” [29]. As illustrated in Figure 6 below, it is a process 
that begins with direction – setting requirements for the intelligence acquirement – and 
resulting in dissemination of the acquired and appropriately affined information. 
Traditionally, the cycle  has been portrayed as an unidirectional DCPD (Direction-Collection-
Processing-Dissemination) sequence on the left in Figure 6 [72]. The model has been heavily 
criticized to the extent of questioning its relevance even as a metaphor or analogy [140], and 
hence attempts have been made to better model the real-life cognitive process. One version, 
used in the FBI, is depicted on the right in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 The Intelligence Cycle [29; 72] 
In essence, intelligence can be seen as a process for establishing and maintaining situational 
awareness [86], and hence it is only logical that an element of cross-check – called active 
collaboration in the FBI model [29] – is introduced. Another way of looking at the process 
was introduced by Stuart Jack, depicting the intelligence analyst at the center of the cycle, 
being involved in all the phases of the process [72]. The fundamental insight is the 
iterativeness of the process, as opposed to sequentiality. When perceived as a cognitive 
process, this idea can be developed to the notion of the intelligence process being a both 
internally iterative and externally interactive, complex web of activities [77]. However, if 
abstaining to simplicity, the iterative nature of the intelligence process itself can be 
represented as an interconnected network topology of the four core functions of the original 
model. 
3.2.3  The Intelligence Cycle as a Situation Awareness Process 
In the OODA model of decision-making, the first segments can be associated with situation 
awareness (SA), and the latter two respectively with making decisions [63]. Bearing in mind 
the situation awareness function of intelligence, and understanding the concept of intelligence 
broadly as a process associated with acquisition of information of any appropriate kind, the 
intelligence process can be perceived as analogous to the SA process of the OODA cycle as 
depicted in Figure 7 below. The intelligence process schematic portrays it as an 
interconnected topology, as suggested by the Brunel team [72], which appropriately models 
the process as iterative, not solely confined to a fixed sequence, which is quite analogous the 
principles of the OODA cycle. 
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Figure 7 The Intelligence Process as the SA Process of the OODA Cycle  
[61; 72] 
From real-life activities’ perspective, perceiving the analogue of the intelligence process to 
the SA process inseparably associated to decision-making is quite appropriate. When making 
decisions – individually or as part of a greater entity – one intuitively adapts one’s thinking to 
the circumstantial factors involved. This, in essence, is an operation not unlike the formal 
representation of the intelligence process, because perception and processing of it is a concept 
that builds upon prior knowledge and presumptions, and processed perceptions in turn 
contribute to the entity of one’s personal pool of knowledge. Both intuitive building of SA 
and the intelligence process build upon an empirical datum which, while being the basis and 
necessity for reflecting upon new information, is a fundamental source of bias, because the 
outcome is always a projection of the datum. Hence, the intelligence process should not be 
mistaken as an undoubtedly objective and flawless concept, but a process of perpetually 
refining an understanding of the perceived matter or phenomenon.
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4  INTELLIGENCE IN CYBER DOMAIN 
Intelligence in cyber domain – or perhaps more appropriately cyber intelligence 
(CYBERINT) – is a concept that is yet to receive consensus – in terms of concept as well as 
terminology. In order to establish a balanced conception of intelligence in cyber domain for 
the purposes of the thesis, a composite needs to be deduced from a number of partially 
contradicting points of view. In the following, this is executed through synthesizing and 
contrasting opinions expressed in literature and by interviewed experts. 
4.1  Defining Cyber Intelligence 
In many respects, the word ‘intelligence’ – and hence also ‘cyber intelligence’ – is conceived 
in different ways. For many, the word is mainly reserved for state-sponsored operatives and 
refers to legitimate activities conducted by official operatives [115; 136]. From another point 
of view, the term cyber intelligence is used on many occasions in a security context, the word 
referring primarily to intelligence on security threats and vulnerabilities – another word used 
is cyber threat intelligence [9; 14]. 
Offensive activities in cyber domain have been addressed in numerous publications. In 
military context, activities in cyber domain – often referred to as Computer Networks 
Operations (CNO) [91] – are categorized as a sub-set of information operations (IO) [79]. 
From this perspective, cyber warfare can be perceived as a cyberspace analogy of electronic 
warfare [126]. The concept of CNO is further divided into a triad of Computer Network 
Attack, Exploitation and Defence (Figure 8 below), in which the final aim of CNE is defined 
as “to gather intelligence from the target network and systems” [103].  
Figure 8 Relation Between CNO and CNE [103] 
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In his thesis, Harry Kantola, for example, has stated that conducting Computer Network 
Attack (CNA) -activities is dependent on advanced intelligence collection, more specifically 
computer network exploitation (CNE) [91].  On another account, Tero Palokangas has 
outlined a ”computer network operations’ kill-chain” [117] based on Jeffrey Carr’s Inside 
Cyber Warfare [65] that strongly incorporates an intelligence – especially offensive – 
component. Furthermore, the role of CNE is outlined as as finding vulnerabilities, 
maintaining target libraries and exploiting information found on networks [117]. In 
conclusion, Hence, in this framework, CNE is perceived symmetrically as intelligence for 
CNO purposes. 
On the other hand, by INSA’s definition “while there is not a currently accepted definition for 
cyber intelligence, it should not be limited to an understanding of network operations and 
activities. Cyber intelligence includes the collection and analysis of information that produces 
timely reporting, with context and relevance to a supported decision maker. The information 
sources used for cyber intelligence are no more limited than they are for any other field that is 
observed and analyzed by intelligence professionals.” [41, p. 1] Albeit indeed to the point, 
this view does not take a stance on the environment operated in or methodology utilized when 
conducting cyber intelligence. It is because the definition stands upon the premise that cyber 
intelligence is not a collection discipline, but “an analytic discipline relying on information 
collected from traditional intelligence sources intended to inform decision makers on issues 
pertaining to operations at all levels in the cyber domain” [105, p. 1]. Fundamentally, cyber 
intelligence is hence perceived as a set of analytical tools, as opposed to being a pervading 
intelligence discipline. 
By another definition, CYBERINT is defined as “obtaining prior knowledge of threats and 
vulnerabilities to information communications systems through a variety of technical means.” 
It comprises of “a series of technological and analytical approaches to cyber-specific 
espionage,” while being “considered independent of traditional SIGINT.” [60] This definition 
is in many respects fundamentally different from the former one introduced by INSA: it 
defines cyber intelligence as a collection discipline instead of a merely analytic one, however 
limiting it to an infrastructure perspective, aimed at mapping out points in physical and 
logical infrastructure exploitable for attacks. In essence, this definition does resemble that of 
CNE. Furthermore, utilization of cyber means for acquiring information within the data 
content in cyber domain or about the physical world and its inhabitants are perceived as 
subordinate to other intelligence disciplines: “for the purpose of conventional intelligence 
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collection [it] can include the penetration of foreign networks to secure information on 
weapons systems, policy positions, and much more. It is invasive, yet does not disrupt, deny, 
or destroy data, it collects” [60]. 
From the Finnish Defence Forces’ perspective, cyber intelligence – or information and 
computer networks intelligence3 – is a subset of SIGINT, alongside with ELINT and 
COMINT, and is further divided into intelligence on telecommunications4 and (foreign) 
intelligence on information systems5 [64; 92; 97]. An illustration of the Finnish military 
intelligence discipline hierarchy is portrayed in Figure 9 below. 
Figure 9 Finnish Classification of Military Intelligence Disciplines [97] 
The fact that processing and analyzing data collected using named methods does not differ 
from other SIGINT analysis [92] strongly advocates the set definitions. From a military 
intelligence point of view, cyber domain provides a new ‘frequency band’ to exploit, and 
cyber intelligence can be seen as extending SIGINT to a new spectrum [92]. Intelligence on 
telecommunications is defined as intelligence on network traffic in cross-border computer 
telecommunications cables, possibly implementing elements of both COMINT and ELINT, 
and foreign intelligence on information systems as technical intelligence activities aimed at 
data on information systems outside the nation’s borders. [113] Being formulated for 
legislative purposes, the definition is quite confining and dictated by need for clear jurisdicial 
boundaries, but indeed does define essential elements of the entity of cyber intelligence. 
                                                 
3 Tietoverkkotiedustelu [113] 
4 Tietoliikennetiedustelu [113] 
5 Ulkomaan tietojärjestelmätiedustelu [113]
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It can be argued that the definition excludes intelligence incorporating a real-world 
component and, furthermore, that there are additional matters and targets that are both 
possible and desirable to reconnoiter through cyber means [90]. Furthermore, it has been 
observed that in general intelligence activities have extended to the new cyber domain, while 
intensity of traditional, physical domain intelligence disciplines has not noticeably decayed 
[81; 89], indicating that cyber intelligence has grown to complement other forms of 
intelligence, which is only logical, because intelligence serves the purpose of acquiring 
information, which today majorly inhabits the digital realm [102]. 
One key aspect that consensus is established upon is that the concept of cyber intelligence 
strongly involves cyber domain – or cyberspace – determinatively as the medium and majorly 
also as the field for activities [64; 80; 81; 89; 90; 92; 95; 99; 102; 112; 115; 116; 121; 131; 
136]. Depending from standpoint and background, there is fluctuation in the details and 
nuances of how the concept of intelligence in cyber domain is perceived. Mikko S. Niemelä 
[112], for example, emphasizes human-machine interaction at the periphery of computer 
networks, pointing out that the information of true value is namely the content produced by 
humans. Rain Ottis, on the other hand, emphasizes the nature of intelligence as violating 
confidentiality of information, and hence specifies the main driver of cyber intelligence 
activities as obtaining access to confidential data. Furthermore, from his point of view, 
activities constitute as cyber intelligence given that they incorporate exploiting vulnerabilities 
that allow access to logical structures of information. [115] Consequently, attacking, 
penetrating and even modifying a system constitutes as cyber intelligence given that the 
motivation is intelligence acquisition, not sabotage or other disruptive purpose. 
Although definitions and conceptions mostly address intelligence – and other activity – 
associated with cyber domain symmetrically as associated with only that environment. 
However, it can be argued that there is a physical domain component to the phenomenon [90]: 
intelligence on whereabouts and activities of targets in the physical realm through the cyber 
domain [91; 99], which is in tune with the conception that cyber intelligence collects 
information about human-machine interaction [112]. For example, utilizing sensors on 
computers, mobile phones, etc. provides a wide range of exploitable information, ranging 
from audio-visual to spatial, movement and orientation information [80; 99]. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that breaching the confidentiality of information in cyber domain through 
physical domain actions can be categorized as cyber intelligence, for example introducing 
physical keyloggers to a system or hacking a system on-site [87, pp. 62–63]. 
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One controversial aspect of categorizing and defining intelligence acquisition in cyber domain 
is information that is publicly available. Many make a distinction between open-source 
intelligence (OSINT) and cyber intelligence [81; 115], however the border is difficult to draw 
[131]. Analogously to afore mentioned view that cyber intelligence can serve as a collection 
method for conventional intelligence [60], it can be pointed out that OSINT is an intelligence 
collection method that can be conducted in many environments [92]. Currently, almost all 
aspects of life – intelligence included – utilize computers in various ways, often very 
comprehensively, but in most cases the activity does not amount to utilizing cyber methods 
per se, more aptly are they characterized as computer-assisted. Analogously, it is apt to 
conclude that extending open-source information searches to digital domain does not 
automatically amount to being cyber intelligence [115]. One suggested characterizing 
distinction is intentionality of publicity of the information [89; 115]. For example, newspaper 
articles, blog postings, tweets etc. are intended to be public and available to virtually anyone. 
However, acquiring information from non-protected corners of the ‘dark web’ [80; 90] or 
utilizing  metadata of files submitted online [10; 28; 78] do not quite stay within limits of 
exploiting intentionally available information. 
It can be argued that OSINT in cyber domain can involve a component that has HUMINT 
characteristics [92], and the same can be argued about social engineering [64]. One good 
example is conducting intelligence collection in social media, which by nature inseparably is 
associated with human interaction, and more importantly social networks are “amazing 
sources of information” [108, p. 37]. Furthermore, publicly available information is noted as 
an inherent and inseparable element in preparation and reconnaissance of operations in cyber 
domain, hacking activities for example [106], which would suggest an open-source element to 
cyber intelligence [99; 116]. One sound argument is that searching information online using 
‘obvious’ methods – such as ‘googling’ – does not amount to being cyber intelligence [115], 
but rather ordinary OSINT. However, when conducting intelligence in public cyber domain in 
a more sophisticated and targeted manner, the setting is prominently different, because then 
the cyber aspect can provide possibilities beyond real-world analogies. For example, ‘Google 
hacking’ [131], ‘big data’ analysis of public information [90], targeted searches in social 
media services [81] and many other target- or purpose-specific methods are well beyond 
’obvious’ and can quite acutely outperform traditional intelligence disciplines in many 
respects. A sensible borderline is difficult to define [131], and undeniably cyber methods 
apply to OSINT [99]. In the framework of examining intelligence acquisition specifically in 
cyber domain, however, artificial exclusions can be concluded counter-productive rather than 
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promoting, because such exclusions render the perspective incomplete and thus limit also the 
conclusions drawn.  
The definition of intelligence in cyber domain is not entirely agreed upon. It can quite 
confidently be concluded that one definitive attribute is the utilization of cyber domain. 
Furthermore, penetrative techniques of acquiring information are agreed to comprise cyber 
intelligence, as are monitoring ones and those having a physical-domain component. 
Disagreement exists however, about whether open source intelligence collection should be 
excluded. When considering expressly intelligence in the framework of cyber domain, it can, 
however, be concluded that all methods collecting information from cyber domain or through 
it about the physical one.  
4.2  Characteristics of Cyber Intelligence 
Intelligence in cyber domain is perceived to have both advocating as well as contesting 
characteristics. First of all, a distinct strength is seen in the stealthiness – or taste- and 
odorlessness – of cyber activity [80]. Albeit evading attribution is of utmost importance to 
cyber operatives [80], the digital realm allows easy deniability of any accusation [81]. 
Furthermore, phenomena occur in cyber domain at the speed of light which, given the right 
circumstances, translates into high speed of intelligence collection [131] and consequently 
lesser probability of immediate detection. Especially in the realm of military intelligence, 
cyber intelligence acquisition requires relatively low investments initially and for operation 
[92], making it an inexpensive way of gaining access to vast amounts of information [94]. 
Instead of financial assets, cyber intelligence requires wit and expertise [92], denoting that the 
key element of an operation is the level of expertise of the personnel [102; 131]. 
Furthermore, the networked and global nature of the cyber domain has resulted in diminishing 
significance of physical distance and proximity, facilitating that many operations can be 
conducted remotely [99]. However, this does not exclusively denote unlimited global reach, 
because the target has to be identified before engaging [90], which in turn may require initial 
support from another intelligence source [131]. One opportunity deriving from negligibility of 
physical location is that operatives – especially illicit – can freely choose an appropriate 
jurisdiction for conducting their business [115], thus excluding the risk of apprehension and 
prosecution in case of getting attributed to the activities conducted. 
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The reach of cyber intelligence methods can be limited by physically isolating confidential 
interaction and information from the cyber domain – for example conversing in person in a 
space with no digital devices or making notes on paper – or by applying cryptographic 
methods [81; 102]. However, records of such interaction can be made second-hand and hence 
indirectly intercepted [112]. Encrypted communications, on the other hand, can be detected 
and possibly intercepted at end-user interface where encryption is not present [81]. Albeit 
critical – and hence attractive – information often is isolated [102] and access to it is 
controlled, it is still bound to be accessed, and the interface access allows for a vast number 
methods of breaching the isolation [99]. Virtually anything with bytes is a potential threat 
[131], meaning that cyber methods possess high versatility and agility. However, the reach – 
or very existence of cyber capabilities – is dependent on the existence and span of the man-
made infrastructure the cyber environment is built upon [97; 112]. 
One significant limitation of intelligence collected by cyber means is contextual ambiguity 
[94; 112] as well as difficulty of verification of collected information [131]. Information 
collected exclusively in cyber domain often lacks detail that identifies the context of activity 
observed [112], and hence false conclusions can be drawn. Furthermore, digital information 
can be forged [94; 115], which allows for deliberately misinforming the intelligence collector. 
Because physical locations of target systems can be unclear [90], this attribute poses a 
potential threat of conducting cyber intelligence acquisition in an adverse environment, 
risking attribution. In general, one weakness of conducting cyber intelligence – especially 
offensive and intrusive – is that cyber activities often leave traces [92], and upon detection the 
target may exploit the established connection in a number of ways ranging from hack-back to 
deliberate misinformation [81; 131]. Furthermore, when conducting intelligence – or any 
other activity – in cyber domain, one faces the risk of malware and other threats. Another 
potential and potent threat to cyber intelligence acquisition is information overload caused by 
vast amounts of available digital information [115], and together with the possibility of 
misinformation and contextual disambiguation reliably refining intelligence from a vast data 
mass might prove too difficult a task. Figure 10 below depicts the afore examined attributes of 
cyber intelligence acquisition in a SWOT matrix.  
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Figure 10 SWOT-analysis of Cyber Intelligence 
4.3  Cyber Intelligence as an Extension of Conventional Intelligence 
Cyber domain allows for implementing more effective alternatives to other intelligence 
disciplines, for example tracking a person through his mobile phone’s position update [81] 
instead of following him in person. Characteristic to cyber intelligence acquisition is that it is 
the only way of acquiring direct access to information that exists only within the digital realm 
[81]. From a larger perspective, however, adequate intelligence acquisition solely from the 
cyber domain is neither possible nor practical [81], except for the purposes of targeting for 
offensive cyber operations [92]. 
The cyber domain can be considered a new realm of conducting activities [99] into which 
today’s information has heavily concentrated [81; 99]. Consequently, intelligence has 
extended to cyber domain alongside with physical domain intelligence remaining active [81; 
89]. Arguably, intelligence should be considered a unified entity in which all branches 
endorse each other [95; 131]. As part of all-intelligence collection, cyber intelligence benefits 
and endorses other forms of intelligence, and in turn cyber intelligence is endorsed by 
information from other sources that is unreachable by cyber means. Moreover, it can be 
concluded that cyber intelligence can be considered an endorsing, cross-cutting extension of 
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conventional intelligence that extends the reach of all conventional intelligence disciplines, as 
illustrated in Figure 11 below: 
Figure 11 Cyber Intelligence as an Endorsing Parallel of Physical 
Domain Intelligence 
4.4  Operatives of Cyber Intelligence 
Cyber intelligence methods are to a high extent available to virtually anyone. However, based 
on motivations, the users can be divided to a relatively small number of categories. On one 
account, most cyber intelligence activities can be assimilated to business efforts, leaving out 
only ideological actors [112]. Mikko Hyppönen [82], however, has categorized threats to 
privacy in cyberspace in three groups:  
• online criminals 
• ideologically motivated operatives, such as hacktivists 
• nation states, governments.
Considering parties conducting intelligence collection, the above outlined categorization 
encompasses majority of those of significance. The most sophisticated operative type is the 
nation state. Typically, such are associated with APT threats [49] and pose targeted threats 
especially to government agencies and companies of interest. The motivation and objective of 
a nation state’s cyber intelligence efforts are typically intelligence collection and possibly 
sabotage [81], and the efforts extend enduringly over a long period of time, targeted 
specifically, carefully concealed [4]. 
Criminals, on the other hand, are driven and motivated by money [81]. As such, their efforts 
are commonly directed at maximizing coverage – number of malware infections or successful 
phishing e-mails – instead of conducting focused, stealthy efforts [49]. As opposed to 
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sanctioned nation state actors, criminals usually lack the jurisdicial privileges of the former. 
However, in some cases criminals have been involved in government-sanctioned intelligence 
efforts [92], effectively transforming the legal constraints of common criminals. In addition to 
criminals, many businesses conduct intelligence acquisition for their own purposes – legally 
or illegally – having fundamentally the same financial driving factor in their operation, but 
carrying out the activity more in the form of legitimate market information collection or 
corporate espionage. Furthermore, businesses may as well be involved in government-
sanctioned intelligence collection or benefit from intelligence gathered by their governments 
[112]. 
In addition to government sanctioned intelligence collection and financially driven such, 
another prominent operative is an ideological one: hacktivists. Instead of money or other gain, 
a hacktivist is driven and motivated by protest [81], thus changing the focus of interest to that 
of an ideology. Although ideological ambitions may take many forms, a hacktivists actions 
generally are logical [81], aimed at correcting a wrong, proclaiming a message or preventing 
actions that conflict with their ideology. Other, marginal types of actors involved in forms of 
intelligence collection exist, comprising curiosity-driven actors such as script-kiddies and 
‘old-school’ code writers as well as radical groups [81]. 
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5  A HIERARCHICAL MODEL OF INTELLIGENCE IN CYBER 
DOMAIN 
For the purpose of analyzing and examining intelligence in cyber domain in a systematic and 
balanced manner, a unified model of the affiliated functions is required. Such a model is, 
however, not readily available in existing literature. The bulk of literature addresses 
intelligence from a security point of view, assuming the point of view and role of the target 
for intelligence collection. With the vast increase of publicly known breaches in private, 
commercial as well as government-related breaches of confidential information, this focus 
answers to the acute need to address discrepancies in security measures of existing 
technology. Year 2014, for example, has been concluded to have been “a year of mega 
breaches,” with publicized incidents affecting hundreds of millions customers [1].  
The understandable and admittedly essential focus on security measures, however, is limited 
in respect to understanding the phenomenon resulting in the discrepancies. Another typical 
focus is to address and examine different fields of cyber activities providing the technical and 
methodological solutions aimed at breaching the confidentiality of undisclosed information. 
For example, numerous studies and have been made on the hacking process and hacking as a 
phenomenon – one prominent and well-known publication is Hacking Exposed 7 [106], and 
there exists a virtually endless variety of case-type inquiries and studies [46; 68] as well as 
news articles about uncovered hacking incidents. Another area that has received in-depth 
attention is social engineering, being closely entangled to hacking. From another point of 
view, technical surveillance methods have been uncovered especially through leaks of 
classified information. 
However meaningful in understanding the vast potential risks to confidentiality and security 
of confidential information, descriptions of technical and methodological solutions enabling 
exploitation of information do not aim at establishing profound understanding about the 
phenomenon of intelligence in cyber domain. In order to develop such understanding, the 
entity of intelligence in cyber domain needs to be arranged and categorized in terms of logical 
sub-sets. For this purpose, existing more narrow and focused models can be used to deduce an 
universal representation. 
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5.1 Identifying Cyber Intelligence Methods 
Perhaps the most prominent phenomenon providing – at least most stereotypically associated 
with – utilizable intelligence is hacking. One well-expressed and useful model is the hacking 
process [132] presented in Figure 12 below. The process is expressed as a logical workflow 
starting with footprinting, followed by scanning and enumeration of the target system, which 
after access is gained through identified exploitable vulnerabilities. Having established access, 
the attacker is enabled to escalate access to the system, pilfer information and possibly alter 
the system in order to cover tracks and create back doors. If the motive of the intruder is 
offensive, gained access can be exploited to deny the service of the system. [106] 
Figure 12 The Hacking Process [106; 132] 
In the described model of the hacking process, footprinting is understood as reconnaissance of 
the target system, carried out through collecting publicly available information about the 
target and its systems, ranging from technical data such as domains and their metadata, IP 
addresses, used technical infrastructure as well as contextual data such as publicly available 
information about the target and its affiliations, i.e. for example information on a target 
organization, its personnel, known practices and security measures, upcoming events etc. 
[132] From an intelligence perspective, the activities carried out in the footprinting phase of 
the workflow can be understood as open-source intelligence (OSINT), which is “drawn from 
publicly available material, including” the Internet, traditional mass media and various 
specialized publications, audio-visual material and geospatial information [31].  
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This is not to say, however, that all information is unlimitedly accessible – gaining access to 
the sources may require effort in a number of ways, technical, spatial as well as contextual 
[142]. Technical effort might mean for example utilizing non-indexed sources, i.e. dark web 
information inaccessible through search engines, or sources available in commercial 
databases, accessible after paying for access rights. Spatial effort might, for example, mean 
accessing possibly even unique information that exists only in non-digital form in designated 
locations such as archives or libraries. Although working language in many disciplines is 
often English and likewise information directly related to technical descriptions or topologies 
of computer systems, which enables low threshold of comprehension of information, in many 
cases information exists in such a form that requires special contextual expertise in order to 
exploit it – the required contextual effort might range from plain linguistics to comprehension 
of complex concepts [136]. 
For the purposes of a model of cyber intelligence methods, footprinting translates to OSINT. 
Bearing in mind established definition and preconditions of cyber intelligence, the whole 
spectrum of OSINT should not, however, be included, but limit the discipline to information 
accessible through cyber means – i.e. information available on or accessible through computer 
systems or networks. As a distinction between this sub-set and other open-source information, 
terms Cyber-OSINT and Non-Cyber-OSINT shall be used, and the former included in the set 
of methods to be analyzed. 
Having established available open-source information through footprinting, the following 
stage of the hacking process workflow is scanning. Scanning is an active networks 
reconnaissance process that provides information on services (ports, protocols) and 
infrastructure (topology, superficial identification and classification attached devices) of the 
perceived target system [132]. Scanning provides the operator with a detailed technical 
overview of the target system visible from the established point of view, facilitating 
identification of possible access points to it.  
After adequate scanning of the target system, the hacking process proceeds to enumeration of 
individual entities the target system. Based on initial perception of the target system, entities 
of interest are identified and fingerprinted more closely, providing more detailed information 
of the system – account names, detailed identification of services and their versions etc. 
Hence, specific exploitable vulnerabilities and points of prospective access are defined. [106; 
132] As an intelligence method scanning defines the perceived infrastructure landscape, 
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analogously to visual scoping of landscape and surroundings in the physical world, whereas 
enumeration can be perceived as analogous to zooming in on identified points of interest in a 
scoped landscape. Both being active and probing in nature, although differing in scope and 
resolution, scanning and enumeration can be treated together as an intelligence method. 
However, the risks and considerations involved differ between operating in public and 
restricted domain, and thus the activity shall be treated separately in these two situations. 
In the hacking process, stages of footprinting, scanning and enumeration of a target system 
can be understood as an iterative, narrowing-down process aimed at establishing a feature or 
features about the target system available for exploitation – the deduced information can then 
be used for gaining access or directing an DOS or DDOS attack on the system [106; 132]. 
When considering the purposes of intelligence, attacking the system can be omitted. Gaining 
access to the system, however, is a meaningful stage of the hacking process in terms of 
gaining intelligence. The set of possible technical solutions for establishing access to a system 
is vast, and the choice of method is made based on identified exploitable vulnerabilities. For 
example, access can be gained through exploiting known standard passwords, faking 
authentication through eavesdropping on traffic packages, accessing backdoors in the 
software present on the system, extracting and cracking password HASH files etc [106; 132]. 
Gaining access to the target system can be considered as an individual method of cyber 
intelligence, being by its intrusive nature analogous to breaking through physical boundaries 
and restraints such as doors and locks. As an individual intelligence method, gaining access 
can be translated to intrusion, meaning illicitly crossing over to within a system of interest. 
In the hacking process workflow, gaining access is followed by escalating privilege [106; 
132]. In terms of technical solutions, the process is iterative from the new standpoint inside 
the system, establishing a new set of perceived objects of interest and identifying specific 
exploitable properties. In terms of intelligence methodology, escalating privilege does not 
translate to yet uncovered methods. However, by definition footprinting cannot be considered 
a sub-set of OSINT while acting inside a restricted system. Instead, the term exploiting 
privileged information shall be used. Scanning and enumeration, on their behalf, can be 
treated as such inside the target system as well, but by nature the activity possesses different 
qualities in terms of detectability, and thus the activities shall be treated separately outside and 
within a system. 
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Furthermore, the hacking process proceeds to pilfering of information, meaning extraction of 
data from within a privileged system [106; 132]. When operating inside restricted 
environments, perceiving the system and extracting data from it are fundamentally two 
distinctively different types of activity. As a real world analogue, pilfering translates to 
physically carrying items out from guarded premises, and terminologically in an intelligence 
framework, the term exfiltration shall be used. As a method of cyber intelligence, exfiltration 
can take a great number of forms, ranging from utilization of physically transportable 
containers (physical drives etc.), incorporating encryption or steganography, using common 
data transfer protocols or other fathomable methods, for example screen shots of accessed 
data, copying by hand, memorizing etc. – such methods can be classified as out of band [55, 
pp. 125–126]. 
The last steps of the hacking process workflow are covering tracks and creating back doors 
[106; 132], meaning altering access privilege and tracking information within the system in 
order to stealthily maintain or create new means of accessing it, for example creating back 
doors. As methods of cyber intelligence, these translate into concepts of obfuscation and 
sustaining access. Physical analogues for them are, for example, repairing inflicted damages 
caused in the process of entering or disabling surveillance and opening locked doors and 
windows respectively. 
The above described hacking process does not, however, represent the entire scope of 
methods utilizable in cyber intelligence. In essence, the described hacking process is a 
targeted, technology-oriented methodology of infiltrating a restricted target system of interest. 
Albeit effective in accomplishing the specific task, its set of methods possesses little qualities 
that would facilitate exploitation of human vulnerabilities. On the other hand, it by nature 
builds upon existing qualities of systems and infrastructure, and does not proactively create 
opportunity for intelligence collection. Nor is it a set of methods that would incorporate 
deriving information through surveilling mass or individual activity. However, hacking can be 
a valuable contributing factor in gaining access and information supporting and enabling such 
capabilities. 
Whereas scanning and enumeration are methods for working toward gaining access inside a 
target system, more is required for developing higher level of situational awareness within it. 
For purposes of establishing an encompassing picture of the target infrastructure both in terms 
of interconnectivity, levels of accessibility and hardware and software configuration, 
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methodology of scanning and enumeration can be utilized for the purposes of determining the 
detailed topology of the infrastructure – possibly simultaneously with respect to internal and 
external connectivity. One descriptive term for this is ‘lateral movement’ [115]. By nature, 
this activity can enable both deducing intelligence about the organization using the network 
and thus working towards desired intelligence aims and, not less importantly, facilitate the use 
of other methods. Being both more profound and elaborate in nature as well as facilitating a 
fundamentally higher level of understanding of the target infrastructure, this activity shall be 
treated as an individual intelligence method, referred to as network mapping. 
The discipline exploiting the direct human aspect in vulnerabilities is called social 
engineering. It is not a single technical solution, but a range of both technical and sociological 
means of deception aimed at exploiting the thoughtlessness, gullibility and/or lack of 
suspicious thinking that allows a perpetrator to gain more access to information or to systems 
containing information [123]. Reflecting on more traditional intelligence disciplines, the core 
quality of social engineering – exploitation of persons and their knowledge – is closely related 
of those of human intelligence (HUMINT), which “is defined as any information that can be 
gathered from human sources. […] Understanding people, with all of their complexities, is 
crucial to the business of running assets to collect HUMINT” [30]. Often social engineering is 
performed in a way that misleads a person through persuasion or deception to perform a 
desired task, for example to install a malicious software or enter a website that has malicious 
intent. This nature of exploiting users and their flaws is not only characteristic, but also 
unique in the spectrum of methodology in the cyber domain, and hence social engineering 
should be treated as a separate intelligence method.   
Many of the methods for intelligence collection in cyber domain are limited to accessing 
digital information within computer systems and networks. The objectives and motives of 
cyber activity, however, originate from the real world and from desires of individuals or 
organizations [105], and hence the objectives of intelligence collection in and through 
cyberspace are fundamentally related to the real world. Bearing this in mind, collecting 
intelligence about real-world targets (persons, objects etc.) through cyberspace can be 
resourceful in many respects. Most currently used computers have built-in webcams and 
microphones, and the amount of smartphone users is predicted to reach 1,75 	
109 in year 2014 
[47], which makes the personal devices a vast potential source of information. Several cases 
of eavesdropping on audio and video sources have been reported [111; 129], and the increase 
of sensors on end-user devices facilitates increasingly detailed information to be collected 
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through them [80]. Crossing over from the digital domain to the real world is by nature a 
distinct kind of intelligence collection, and hence physical surveillance through cyber means 
shall be treated as an individual intelligence collection method. 
Whereas many cyber intelligence methods target individual entities (systems, organizations, 
individuals etc.), much can be learned from analyzing the traffic within a network. Many 
companies, VeriSign for example, offer tools for network analysis “designed to provide 
telecommunications carriers with cost-effective solutions for revenue assurance and network 
optimization” [52]. While motives can on many occasions be legitimate, analyzing network 
traffic and behavior can be used for deriving situational awareness on multiple levels. 
Changes in macro-level traffic patterns can indicate a changes or disturbance in both cyber 
and real-world domains, for example in real-world be a sign of a terrorist attack or an 
outbreak of a disease, in cyber domain on the other hand a sign of a DDOS attack or the 
emergence of a new malware [83]. On micro-level, changes in an individual’s activity on 
social media (Twitter, Facebook etc.) can indicate changes in his/hers real-life tendencies 
[134]. In many countries, for example Sweden, legislation permits collection of intelligence 
from network infrastructure. This does not, however, imply a carte blanche: intelligence 
collection is strictly regulated and monitored. [85] Terminologically, intelligence collection 
based on online activity shall be referred to in the study as network surveillance. 
One phenomenon having practically as long a history as cyberspace itself is malware. 
Whereas in early times malware proved to be more of a nuisance to users through crippling 
systems or causing massive spamming, recent developments have proven that malicious 
programs increasingly endanger confidentiality of information, along with its integrity and 
availability. The scope of malware capable of data theft ranges from mass-targeted ones that 
steal private confidential information (usernames, passwords, credit card information etc.) of 
anyone they might come across [40] to target-system or target-organization specific 
surveillance [143]. Compared to other cyber intelligence methods, the use of malware is 
characterized by independence from operator oversight, and thus shall be treated as an 
individual method of intelligence collection or enabler of the use of other methods through 
creating points of entry. 
While most cyber intelligence methods are characterized by the ability of being carried out 
remotely, but much can be achieved through physical proximity and access as well. Such 
attacks are referred to as physical attacks, which can range from personally accessing a target 
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system on-site (for example accessing an equipment room, performing a cold boot attack) to 
introducing malicious hardware to the target system (for example a keylogger or network-
connected hacking device) [87, pp. 62–64]. While a physical attack may in many cases risk 
detection and perpetrator identification, if successful it can at best circumvent a system’s 
whole security infrastructure. 
For most parts, cyber intelligence collection method are characterized by exploiting existing 
vulnerabilities in existing software and hardware infrastructure – in a sense, actions are hence 
dictated by the cyber terrain. This postulate, however, only applies to the extent where 
software and hardware supply chain stays intact and is not affected by actors with means to 
alter products in order to serve their own cause. Vulnerabilities of components in cyber 
infrastructure typically arise from flaws – intentional or non-intentional – spanning over the 
whole life cycle of an infrastructure. With vulnerabilities originating spontaneously in the 
supply chain, it is hardly implausible the “supply chain for electronic components, including 
microchips, could be infiltrated at some stage by hostile agents” [59]. The software supply 
chain, on its behalf, “connects software suppliers, service suppliers, contractors, distributors, 
retailers and end-users. The structure is so complex that potential risks exist in every step.” 
[73] There have been alleged cases of manufacturers’ shipped hardware being diverted to an 
intelligence agency’s workshop for alterations before being delivered [88], as well as 
aspirations to dictate building-in vulnerabilities by legislative means [75]. While requiring 
prominent capacity in order to avail, “once malicious firmware has been inserted into 
electronic components, it can be almost impossible to detect” [59], which stands also in cases 
of pre-installed compromised software. Thus, alterations made in the supply chain are 
considered an individual method in the cyber intelligence collection methods’ framework. 
5.2  Identifying Evaluating Criteria 
Having established a set of categorized intelligence methods in the cyber domain, a set of 
criteria is required in order to assess and evaluate the value of different intelligence methods. 
Existing, publicly available models for evaluating intelligence focus mainly on the cognitive 
factors and security processes, the perspective being majorly military [29]. When assessing 
the entity of methods for cyber intelligence from a more general perspective, a somewhat 
different perspective is justifiable: the choice and extent of use of intelligence methods is not 
solely dictated by performance, but need to be balanced with respect to risk and capability. 
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In a study made on military intelligence, it was concluded that the effectiveness “is directly 
related to how useful its output is to users” [130]. Since intelligence is often time-critical, 
especially in the cyber framework where advancements can take place nearly at the speed of 
light, the speed of a method is to be considered a meaningful factor. Intelligence collection 
resources are seldom infinite and the volume of raw data available virtually abysmal, which 
demands efficiency of the method used. In order to be capable of deducing meaningful 
information from the environment, the resolution of the method used needs to be sufficient. 
Especially in cyber domain where the context of activity can in many cases be ambiguous 
[112], it is imperative that the information collected can be verified to a sufficient level of 
certainty. The products of intelligence – be it in a military, business or other context – are 
fundamentally a basis for decision-making and situational awareness, which calls for 
precision, which can be evaluated in terms of validity and reliability. 
Perhaps the most self-evident criterion for evaluating intelligence is the capability of the 
method. Considering the dependency on technological aspects, being up-to-date in terms of 
technology is imperative, especially being sufficiently informed about the prospects in the 
target environments and possessing sufficient technology to advance one’s objectives. The 
former is highly proximate with the requirement of technical expertise: the more sophisticated 
the target organization and systems are, the higher level of expertise an operator requires. In 
addition to that, when it comes to information of non-technical nature, sufficient contextual 
expertise is requires as well – for example linguistic skills or understanding of other specialty 
fields. Even though many point out that carrying out tasks in cyber domain can be relatively 
cheap [92], one must not overlook the impact of resources – funds and number of personnel – 
on effectivity. Intelligence is goal-oriented by nature, aimed at providing sound information 
for decision-making. In order to efficiently allocate tools and personnel to tasks that serve the 
desired purpose, leadership is required. No intelligence discipline is intended for operating 
individually, but their efforts are used to both verify each other’s observations and 
assessments and steer and focus efforts toward requirements yet to be met and matters 
requiring closer observation. Hence from intelligence collection point of view, the support of 
other intelligence sources is to be considered. 
Thirdly, for both legal and secrecy reasons, the use of cyber intelligence methods bear risk 
factors to be considered. Firstly, jurisdictional limitations are a significant risk factor for any 
operative in cyber domain: even though little international consensus exists regarding cyber 
intelligence activities, national legislation differs intensely from a country to another, which is 
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a factor most operatives need to bear in mind when conducting cyber activities. Secondly, 
secrecy is in many respects a quality to be fostered in cyber domain: avoiding attribution to 
dubious let alone illegal activity is in most cases to be pursued, detection of used 
methodology and tools might render them useless, and a target noticing getting attention can 
complicate an operation significantly. As risk factors, these translate into exposure of method, 
operative and target. 
5.3  Identifying the Operative Types 
In order to analyze the qualities of the identified cyber intelligence methods with respect to 
the identified evaluating criteria, the circumstantial perspective needs to be defined in terms 
of operative, target and setting. In order to grasp an encompassing understanding about the 
subject, it is convenient to choose perspectives from different verges of the field. In order to 
facilitate a analysis, framework scenarios are needed in order to sensibly evaluate the methods 
against the criteria. Scenarios are derived from the core categorization outlined by Hyppönen, 
discussed earlier in Section 4.4: 
1. Finnish criminal organization, operating from Finland.  
• Objective: acquire any information and means exploitable for direct financial 
revenue. 
2. Hacktivist group from an Arabic-speaking country, operating from the Middle 
East.  
• Objective: defacing official Finnish government websites and social media 
accounts with propaganda of the group’s ideological agenda. 
3. Non-European foreign nation state, conducting intelligence operations on Finnish 
target organizations and systems. 
• Objective: acquire confidential information about Finnish R&D on online 
communication security technology. 
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5.4  A Hierarchical Model of Cyber Intelligence 
The identified set of cyber intelligence methods and assessment criteria are formulated into an 
AHP hierarchy. Table 1 below summarizes the identified intelligence methods, evaluating 
criteria and circumstantial perspectives. From the methods and criteria, an AHP-hierarchy can 
be composed, treating the intelligence methods as alternatives of the hierarchy, and the 
evaluating criteria as criteria and sub-criteria of the hierarchy.  
Table 1 Elements of the Hierarchical Model of Intelligence in Cyber 
Domain 
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For the purposes of collecting expert assessments, the online interface of Expert Choice 
Comparion Suite is utilized, allowing the contributors to submit evaluations as an online 
survey. The matrix of composed AHP-hierarchy is displayed in Figure 13 below. 
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Figure 13 AHP-hierarchy in Expert Choice Comparion Suite 
Using AHP, having combined identified assessment criteria and cyber intelligence acquisition 
methods into a hierarchy and applying different circumstantial attributes to the assessments, 
sets of circumstantially dependently prioritized methods are acquired. When comparing the 
sets of priorities, circumstantially converging and diverging shapes can be identified. This is 
illustrated in Figure 14 below: 
Figure 14 The Principle of Assessing Intelligence Methods Using an AHP 
Hierarchy 
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5.5  Composing the Survey Based on the AHP-model 
The survey is composed with the following measurement method and evaluation options: 
• For each scenario, a separate survey is carried out. 
• Criteria and sub-criteria are prioritized by submitting direct priority input (0-100%). 
• For each criterion, all sub-criteria are evaluated prioritized on the same screen.  
• Alternatives are evaluated on an evenly distributed 20-step scale (0-100%), with the 
option of deeming an evaluation not applicable for evaluation against a certain 
criterion. 
• For each criterion, all alternatives are evaluated on the same screen. 
Cover letter for the survey is depicted in Annex 3, and a detailed implementation of the 
survey is depicted in Annex 4. 
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6   CIRCUMSTANTIAL APPLICABILITY OF CYBER INTELLIGENCE 
ACQUISITION METHODS 
From the survey conducted based on the established model of intelligence acquisition 
methods in cyber domain, a number of conclusions can be deduced both about general 
applicability of different methods, as well as differences in their applicability for different 
purposes.  
6.1 Overview of the Results 
The survey produced three sets of data – one for each scenario. Raw data of completed 
surveys are presented in numeric form in Annex 5, and resulting priorities for each scenario 
are presented in Annex 6. The computed data is presented in unnormalized form to account 
for differences of scores between scenarios. Furthermore, Ideal Mode with Aggregating 
Individual Judgment (AIJ) -option is used. 
For further analysis, resulting assessments of method priorities have been refined into radar 
charts. Figures 15 and 16 represent composite priorities of assessed methods with respect to 
all criteria. In Figures 17-19, priorities have been presented with respect to individual main 
assessment criteria. The radar chart is chosen because the data includes a great number of 
individual data classes (15 methods) with common axis dimensions (0–90%). 
  
The resulting priorities of individual cyber intelligence acquisition methods represent their 
preferability – or applicability – in a set frame of reference: the higher the score is, the more 
favorable the method is. In the radar chart, convergence of a priority data set to a spherical 
plot would designate equal resulting priorities of each method. Principally, the overall and 
criteria-specific priorities of cyber intelligence acquisition methods are assessed to be along 
the same lines. For scenarios 1 and 2, assessed priorities differ only little, however scenario 3 
tends to be assessed higher on many accounts. Figure 15 below shows the calculated 
arithmetically averaged priorities of the cyber intelligence acquisition methods. 
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Figure 15 Arithmetically Averaged Priorities of Cyber Intelligence 
Acquisition Methods 
6.2  Assessment on the Survey Results 
The number of responses received to the survey was relatively low: out of 14 requests, 4 
complete surveys were submitted. Additionally, 5 partial responses were submitted. These 
assessments were omitted in order to sustain balance in the data sets: dissonant partial 
assessments could distort the results of an individual survey, with greatest impact on the head 
part of the submitted assessments, and also create an imbalance between the data sets of the 
scenarios. For data sets of each scenario, standard deviations have been computed in order to 
assess the level of consensus between the participants. Computed mean, median, minimum 
and maximum standard deviations are presented in Tables 2–3 below.  
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Table 2 Standard Deviations of Participants’ Assessments 
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Table 3 Standard Deviations of Participants’ Normalized Assessments to 
criteria weights 
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Overall, the mean standard deviations for the bulk of the data – assessments of intelligence 
methods against individual criteria – is quite high, approximately 0.20, which is 20% of the 
assessment scale. Hence, the level of agreement between participants is limited, which is 
rather understandable considering that the individuals taking part in the survey represented a 
wide range of backgrounds and hence points of view. Considering that the number of 
participants is quite low, a single differing opinion may have a disproportionately prominent 
impact on the computed standard deviation. For scenarios 1 and 2, the mean and median 
standard deviations are substantially higher than for scenario 3, consequently suggesting a 
lower level of consensus. This could be caused by the greater level of perceived ambiguity of 
the first two scenarios, consequently resulting in individuals interpreting them and evaluating 
them differently. 
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One source of error is that the participants are likely to have experienced ambivalence and 
uncertainty regarding the survey format, especially when making their first assessments. 
Assuming that the assessments have been submitted in order, starting with scenario 1 and 
ending with scenario 3, the participants are likely to have become increasingly familiar with 
the survey format and have established a consistent attitude toward the assessments as the 
survey advanced. Consequently, scenario 1 is more likely to have inconsistency within data 
sets than the other two. AHP inconsistency ratio cannot be computed for data sets because 
pairwise comparison was not used. 
When comparing resulting priorities of methods in different scenarios, one aspect to be 
considered is the normalization feature of the AHP: assessed weights of criteria and sub-
criteria weights are normalized in order to conform the weights to a uniform scale where the 
sum of individual global weights is exactly 1 [8]. The weighting coefficients of the main 
criteria for the scenarios are presented in Table 5. A full account on the computed weights of 
criteria and sub-criteria can be found in Annex 6. 
As a consequence of normalization, any intended implied difference between inputs submitted 
to different scenarios is reduced to a uniform scale. Consequently, the standard deviations of 
the participants’ normalized criteria weight assessments (Table 3) are substantially lower than 
those of assessed values for methods. Specifically for the purposes of contrasting assessments 
on different scenarios as well as those submitted by different individuals, this trait is 
appropriate rather than adverse, because the purpose of assigning criteria priorities is to 
establish their significances compared to each other. Furthermore, such mapping conforms 
possibly divergent perceptions of the input scale used. 
Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis (Table 4) was conducted on the data. Dynamic Sensitivity 
–functionality of Expert Choice Comparion was utilized, experimenting on the weight of each 
criterion individually. The upper and lower limits recorded indicate the priority values at 
which the rank order of the cyber intelligence acquisition methods altered. The sensitivity 
range was in the order of magnitude of ±0.02-0.03 for Scenarios 1 and 3, and ±0.06 for 
Scenario 2 denoting that even quite small changes in the criteria weight distribution affect the 
rank order of methods. 
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Table 4 Sensitivity Analysis of Criteria Weights 
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6.3  Analysis of Results Acquired from the Survey 
6.3.1  Weights of Criteria 
Table 5 below presents the criteria priorities composed from individual assessments. The 
values are presented in local form, meaning that the sum of priorities of each set of sub-
criteria is 1.0. Depending on the scenario at hand, participants evaluated priorities of the 
criteria with some level of variation. The order of magnitude of priorities of the main 
evaluating criteria in scenarios 1 and 3 were assessed consistently as risk being most 
significant and performance the least, however the priorities were almost equally divided for 
both scenarios. For scenario 2, risk was assessed close to negligible, and performance 
considerably most significant with a share of over 50%. 
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Table 5 Local Weights of Evaluating Criteria 
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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			 0+18 0+14 0+12 0+18
Out of the sub-criteria for performance, efficiency was assessed to be of highest priority for 
scenarios 1 and 2 and second highest for scenario 3, whereas speed was assessed  equally 
significant to efficiency in scenario 1 and validity most significant in scenario 3 by a small 
margin. For all scenarios, verifiability was assessed least significant. Valuing efficiency of the 
method high suggests that it is one of the benefits sought from utilizing cyber intelligence. 
For capability, technology and expertise were assessed most significant, while support from 
other INTEL was deemed least significant. Technical expertise was assessed more important 
in scenarios 1 and 2, whereas in scenario 3 their shares were virtually equal. Evaluating 
technology and technological expertise high suggests that technological sophistication and 
skill is a key element in conducting cyber intelligence activities.  
For risk, exposure of operative was deemed most and jurisdiction least significant for 
scenarios 1 and 2, whereas for scenario 3, allocation was almost shared alike, with exposure 
of operative and method having slightly higher priority. The evaluated priorities suggest that 
avoiding attribution is deemed of high value when conducting intelligence in cyber domain, 
whereas legal considerations are considered of lesser importance.  
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6.3.2  Overall Priorities 
Figure 16 Priorities of the Intelligence Methods With Respect to All 
Assessment Criteria 
As depicted in Figure 16 above, in general the priorities of the intelligence methods are 
assessed substantially higher with respect to scenario 3 than the others. Out of 15 methods 
assessed, the values for scenario 3 amount to over 70% for six methods, 60-70% for three and 
50-60% for four, whereas for scenario 1 the amounts are one, three and four and for scenario 
2 two, three and seven respectively. For all scenarios, cyber-OSINT is assessed the most and 
physical attack and alterations in the supply chain are assessed the least preferable. The 
preferability assessments on cyber-OSINT, social engineering and network mapping are 
deemed close to same for all scenarios. 
The overall priority assessment suggests that for sophisticated cyber intelligence operative 
most intelligence methods are applicable to a higher extent than for operatives with lesser 
means. Activities requiring physical access such as altering products en route or accessing 
systems on-site are deemed less preferable, which would indicate a general tendency of 
preferring operating remotely.  
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6.3.3  Performance 
Figure 17 Priorities of the Intelligence Methods With Respect to 
Performance 
Priorities of methods with respect to performance, as depicted in Figure 17 above, indicate a 
close resemblance between scenarios 1 and 2, whereas on the account of scenario 3 a number 
of methods stand out. For scenario 3, intrusion, exploiting privileged information, exfiltration 
of data, obfuscation and malware are assessed of substantially higher priority than for the 
other scenarios. Overall, physical attack, alterations in the supply chain and physical 
surveillance are assessed least preferable in terms of performance. For scenario 2, scanning 
and enumeration in public domain is assessed relatively more preferable, and the preferability 
is assessed equal for all scenarios for over 50% of the methods. 
The fact that most methods have been assessed equally preferable in terms of performance 
suggests that the relative effectivity of many intelligence acquirement methods is to a high 
extend independent of circumstances. On the account of methods with variation in assessed 
preferability it can be suggested that the performance of the method could be more 
circumstantially dependent, hence being varyingly applicable to different situations. 
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6.3.4  Capability 
Figure 18 Priorities of the Intelligence Methods With Respect to 
Capability 
As depicted in Figure 18 above, the most prominent differences between the intelligence 
acquisition methods arise when compared with respect to capability of operative. Overall, in 
context of scenario 3 the methods are prominently more preferable, none having been 
assessed below 50%. When considering the two other scenarios, preferability of malware, 
network surveillance and exfiltration of data are assessed equal, whereas physical attack, 
alterations in the supply chain and social engineering are assessed most prominently more 
preferable in the context of scenario 1, and scanning and enumeration in both domains as well 
as intrusion in the context of scenario 2. 
Unsurprisingly, the applicability of the intelligence acquisition methods are evaluated highest 
from nations-state operative’s perspective, which reflects the fact that superior means 
translate into higher capability to apply various methods. Considering the other two scenarios, 
the methods most prominently in favor of scenario 1 indicate correlation between the 
capability and physical proximity, whereas those in favor of scenario 2 would suggest more 
prominent assessed praxis in core hacking activities.  
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6.3.5  Risk 
Figure 19 Priorities of the Intelligence Methods With Respect to Risk 
As depicted in Figure 19, assessed priorities of most cyber intelligence acquisition methods 
are very close to equal for all the scenarios when perceived from risk perspective, unlike the 
other evaluating criteria. The most preferable – and hence least risky – methods are assessed 
to be cyber-OSINT and scanning and enumeration in both domains, whereas the least 
preferable are assessed to be physical attack and alterations in the supply chain. 
The data quite prominently suggests that perceived risks involved in conducting cyber 
intelligence activities are rather associated with the attributes and qualities of the methods 
utilized rather than the circumstances of by and upon whom the activity is conducted. The 
assessed level of risk quite distinctly increases in proportion to the level of insolence and 
invasiveness of the method, subtle and non-invasive methods like cyber-OSINT and scanning 
and enumeration being least risky, whereas methods requiring physical access to the target 
system being considered most risky. 
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7  CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Overall, making effective use of the cyber domain creates substantial potential in the current 
world where all aspects of life are increasingly networked and digitized [64; 116]. This stands 
also for intelligence in cyber domain. Due to the migration of information into digital form 
and networked environments [102], it even can be argued that forgoing its possibilities could 
prove substantially limiting [64]. Furthermore, segregating related activities in the physical 
and cyber domains should be refrained from, because in many respects the cyber domain can 
provide new perspectives to phenomena in the physical, whereas the physical domain 
provides concrete context to phenomena in the cyber domain. 
 It can be concluded that Intelligence in cyber domain is an endorsing, cross-cutting 
intelligence discipline that adds value to all aspects of conventional intelligence and 
furthermore that it bears a substantial amount of characteristic traits – both advantageous and 
disadvantageous – and furthermore that the applicability of cyber intelligence methods is only 
partly circumstantially limited. 
7.1  Overview of the Research Process 
The main objective of the study was to assess, to what extent the applicability of cyber 
intelligence acquisition methods is circumstantial. In order to reach a conclusion, the very 
concept of intelligence in cyber domain, its defining attributes, methods, factors dictating its 
applicability, and range of operatives were to be addressed. For analysis, means to assess the 
applicability of cyber intelligence acquisition methods were required. 
The study was conducted in sequential a manner, starting with defining the concept of 
intelligence in cyber domain and identifying its key attributes, followed by identifying the 
range of intelligence methods in cyber domain, criteria influencing their applicability, and 
types of operatives utilizing cyber intelligence. The methods and criteria were refined into a 
hierarchical model, to which was also incorporated the element of circumstantial context in 
order to facilitate analysis on how different circumstances affect the applicability of cyber 
intelligence acquisition methods. 
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In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the topic and facilitate analysis from 
multiple angles, a spectrum of sources was used. The existing conceptions of cyber 
intelligence were mapped through an extensive literature study on a wide variety of sources. 
The established understanding was further developed through 15 semi-structured interviews 
with experts of different backgrounds, whose wide range of points of view proved to 
substantially enhance the perspective on the subject. Furthermore, four of the interviewed 
experts participated in a relatively extensive survey based on the constructed hierarchical 
model on cyber intelligence that was formulated in to an AHP hierarchy and executed in the 
Expert Choice Comparion online application. Through the survey, the qualitative empirical 
findings were enhanced by quantifying expert perceptions and thus pointing out further 
distinctive traits of cyber intelligence. 
7.2  Summary of Results 
Intelligence, in essence, can be characterized as collection of information in a manner that 
violates confidentiality. This trait, however, does not imply legal or moral infringement, albeit 
such can take place if intelligence is collected in a belligerent manner. Instead, information is 
collected and processed in order to deduce in-depth understanding of the subject at hand. For 
many, the term ‘intelligence’ is exclusively reserved for with collection of information for the 
purposes of national interest, conducted by the military or designated agencies. However, if 
one dismisses this premise and perceives intelligence in a more general context, it can be 
concluded that it is a cognitive process of focused and purpose-oriented gathering of 
information that comprises the iterative elements of direction, collection, processing and 
dissemination. Furthermore, in the context of human decision-making process, intelligence 
can be concluded to be quite analogous to the situation awareness process in general.  
Intelligence in cyber domain, on its behalf, bears a multitude of implications, depending on 
standpoint and context. In addition to the obvious military implication, another common 
association is that of security: cyber threat intelligence focuses on analyzing the vulnerability 
to threats present in the cyber domain. However, in a general frame of reference, cyber 
intelligence connotes quite a variety of methods facilitating acquisition of exploitable 
information. As can be derived from military context, cyber intelligence incorporates a 
substantial intrusive element that in essence does not differ from offensive in cyber domain 
otherwise than how it relates to the contents of target systems: cyber offensive strikes the 
integrity and availability of information and systems, cyber intelligence only alters systems in 
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order to gain more access or avert detection. Moreover, although cyber intelligence 
acquisition methods in many cases incorporate methods that provide unauthorized access to 
information, there is also a substantial public-domain element to it. 
From the perspective of applicability of intelligence acquisition methods in cyber domain, the 
setting can be modeled in a hierarchical manner: 
Figure 20 Hierarchical Model for Evaluating Circumstantial Applicability 
of Cyber Intelligence Methods 
As outlined in Figure 20 above, the assessment of applicability of cyber intelligence 
acquisition methods can be broken down to three criteria: performance of the method, 
capability of the operative and risk. The criteria comprise sub-criteria. The setting is 
approached with respect to set circumstances of assessment – operative, target and 
environment – which are reflected in weights of the criteria and assessments of the methods 
with respect to criteria. The outcome of the assessment is a scored ranking of the intelligence 
methods that represents the circumstantial applicability of the different methods of cyber 
intelligence acquisition. 
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The hierarchical model was applied to scenarios derived from widely accepted categorization 
of most prominent cyber intelligence operatives: nation state actors, criminals and idealistic. 
Overall, analysis based on the hierarchical model indicated that the circumstantially most 
applicable methods entail low level of invasiveness and allow for any desirable distance to 
target, whereas the least applicable methods required physical access to target. The fact that 
evading detection and especially attribution is a substantial defining inhibition in cyber 
domain endorses the indicated conclusion. Furthermore, operating from safe distance and 
favorable jurisdiction are considered advantages of cyber intelligence and possible traces left 
a disadvantage, which advocates the assessment that concrete actions in the physical domain 
are deemed inferior in terms of applicability. 
On another account, the hierarchical model appears to provide insight into comparing and 
assessing cyber intelligence operatives. Firstly, the overall priorities appear to reflect the 
differences in level of utilization of cyber intelligence methods. From performance 
perspective, the scores yielded primarily reflect the methods’ qualities with respect to the 
target rather than operative. However, the assessment is subjective from the operative’s 
perspective, and hence the assessments reflect also how performance of the methods varies 
with perspective. Capability, on the other hand, reflects most the capacity and sophistication 
of the operative, showing substantial differences especially in favor of a nation-state 
operative. Moreover, more subtle differences in assessed risk reflects the conception that to a 
high extent the level of risk different operatives face differs only a little, and is rather 
dependent on the method utilized. 
Lastly, based on the study, it can be concluded that the applicability of intelligence acquisition 
methods in cyber domain is to a high extent circumstantial, depending on attributes of the 
operative and target in question as well as the setting in question. Overall, applicability of 
cyber intelligence acquisition methods can be assessed to be inversely proportional to the 
extent of invasiveness of the method. In other words, stealthy methods with negligible chance 
of attribution are deemed most applicable, whereas methods requiring physical access to 
target are deemed least applicable. This applies, however, predominantly to the relative 
applicability of methods in a given setting, whereas the applicability varies with 
circumstances, especially with respect to capability of the operative. 
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7.3  Validity and Reliability 
The perspective of the study was quite ample. A broad angle of view was chosen at the 
expense of the level of detail because of scarcity of existing public research that would focus 
on the intelligence aspect of activity in cyber domain, which in turn shows from the modest 
consensus on the concept. Moreover, also the chosen security classification level of the work 
dictated that concepts needed to be addressed on a general rather than detailed level, because 
when examined in detail, aspects of intelligence easily turn out to be classified. Addressing 
the topic on a general and conceptual level results in possible limitations to validity and 
reliability of the study. 
Reliability of research denotes the extent to which the research yields consistent findings 
[127, p. 680]. One illustrating indicator of the consistency of data available on the subject is 
the substantial dispersion of opinions indicated in the conducted AHP survey – the mean 
standard deviation of submitted assessments was approximately 20%. The number, together 
with the fact that the number of data sets was a humble four, indicates limitations in the 
reliability of the qualitative data in the research, possibly originating from participants’ 
differing subjective conceptions of the scenarios and assessment scales. However, the 
multiple sub-criteria to each evaluating criteria in the hierarchical model accumulated to a 
score averaged and weighted according to the AHP principle, which contributes to 
diminishing fluctuations in the data. However, the standard deviation can be argued to 
indicate more generally the level of consensus among experts on the subject. Moreover, 
variation in perceptions was evident in both literary sources and interviews. On a general and 
conceptual level such as in this study, the topic is highly subject to personal opinion. Partly, 
the veil of secrecy around intelligence can be indicted for this: detailed public information is 
scarce. Partly, however, the likely reason is the abstract nature of cyber phenomena, which in 
many respects is difficult or impossible to measure and quantify. The topic was addressed 
broadly both quantitatively in terms of the crude hierarchical model as well as qualitatively, 
and hence it is sensible that opinions from different standpoints show differences. 
Validity of research in turn denotes the extent to which the research accurately measures the 
subject studied [127, p. 684]. Albeit the chosen level of detail translates into possible 
limitations in the reliability of the research, the wide selection of research methods and 
sources contribute to increasing its validity. The conclusions drawn were based on a range of 
literary sources, a relatively encompassing selection of interviewees and an extensive AHP-
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survey. The evidence appears to converge, and the constructed hierarchical model appears to 
reflect the qualitative results yielded in the research. The general nature of the research, 
however, causes also potential limitations to the validity of the conclusions drawn. Firstly, the 
literary base was limited to non-classified sources. Even though little public research on cyber 
intelligence exists, it is likely rather than improbable that classified studies have been 
conducted, because developing cyber capabilities is an acute trend on national level in many 
countries. Hence, basing research on literature that possibly provides a mere peek to the 
subject might result in misconceptions and drawing conclusions that are fundamentally off. 
Furthermore, the same appears to apply to interviewees: on many accounts it was evident that 
conducting interviews for a thesis that is going to be publicly available substantially limited 
the depth and detail of information disclosed. In turn, lack of detail might result in 
misinterpreting the statements given. Moreover, the hierarchical model was based on the afore 
mentioned sources, which might be reflected in shaping the model unrealistically. The 
assessments submitted to the survey in turn might be off due to participants misinterpreting 
the intended point of view or scales of the survey. With respect to validity, the most probable 
source of limitations is the constrained knowledge base the argument is based upon, but in 
turn the wide variety of sources counters the limitations of individual sources. 
  
7.4  Discussion 
Although it could superficially be argued that intelligence collection in cyber domain is a 
discipline of immense potential, approach to the topic should be kept in sensible perspective. 
To begin with, acquisition of intelligence in cyber domain should not be mistaken as being 
associated only symmetrically to cyber purposes, i.e. facilitating other activities in the same 
domain. Neither the infrastructure of and nor the information in the cyber domain exist for 
their own sake, but serve a physical domain purpose [90], and hence also intelligence 
collected in the cyber domain serve purposes of physical domain actors – persons, 
organizations, nations… From this standpoint, it is only logical to conclude that information 
in the two domains is affiliated rather than distinct, and the issue addressed should be about in 
what way (and form) the intelligence is acquired most suitably in the given circumstances and 
based on what the intelligence can be verified. Moreover, when considering the discovery that 
cyber intelligence is a discipline that cross-cuttingly extends and enhances the reach and 
potential of all conventional intelligence disciplines (Figure 11), the baseline and background 
information from conventional intelligence acquisition methods can be concluded to provide 
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cyber intelligence perspective and context that are often more ambiguous when exclusively in 
the digital environment. 
Cyber intelligence is widely demonized and condemned in public discourse [96], most 
prominently for the implications to personal privacy. However, the hype around the topic can 
be counter-productive in terms of dismissing the bigger picture [64]. Namely for the purposes 
of putting phenomena into perspective and understanding the gestalt of cyber intelligence, it is 
meaningful to examine it in a neutral context and broad perspective. Hence, given that 
existing research addressing specifically cyber intelligence as a whole is scarce, the chosen 
approach to this study is justified, notwithstanding the limitations to validity and reliability. It 
is only through public research that the understanding of concepts and phenomena evolves in 
the academic framework, and from there the established conceptions further provide 
perspective to public discourse. Moreover, if examined in the framework of academic 
research, an analogy is quite easily drawn between the approaches of intelligence and 
academic research: in both concepts, information is collected, analyzed and utilized in a 
purpose-oriented manner. Given that information increasingly inhabits namely the cyber 
environment, it can be argued that the distinction is merely semantic and based on the 
motivation of collection. 
7.5  Future Work 
The results of the study yield a great number of potential future work, both in terms of further 
developing the research conducted as well as independent areas of study. As concluded, the 
validity and reliability of research conducted and conclusions drawn were substantially 
limited by the assumed broad scope of study and chosen public base of information. Building 
upon the general conceptions outlined in this study, the perception of both the entity and 
narrower aspects of cyber intelligence can be further developed. Conducting a similar 
research based on more sensitive data is a quite obvious possible way of refining the findings 
of this study, but further developing the methodological solutions is another potent option. 
The hierarchical model formulated as well as how it was applied to the research has multiple 
prospective aspects to be improved. To begin with, the subject of whether the elements of the 
model – criteria as well as intelligence methods – represent the concept and its dependencies 
in the best possible manner. One aspect that would especially improve the focus of the model 
is defining more detailed scenarios. For example, the model could be utilized in a case-based 
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study of online threats. Considering collecting data using the model, more specific assessment 
scales could be useful. Even defining more concrete and unambiguous scales individually for 
each criterion could prove valuable, because differences in subjective understanding of the 
scale was an obvious source of imprecision. Furthermore, making assessments as a group of 
experts instead of submitting individual assessments could help finding a consensus as well as 
understanding the assessment scales alike, thus reducing deviation in the assessments. 
Furthermore, the  assessments could be conducted in an iterative manner, for example first 
establishing consensus about the weights of the criteria and separately assessing the 
alternatives using priorities defined earlier. 
When addressing a concept as controversial as cyber intelligence, interviews conducted could 
benefit from increased concreteness, for example selecting a real-life case as the theme of 
interviews. A less conceptual and more technically oriented approach could also prove 
valuable. Another approach could be utilizing the Delphi method [127, p. 38] to iterate the 
expert opinions, however in such case the amount of interviewees needs perhaps to be 
smaller. 
Moreover, from personal security perspective – or operational security in military framework 
– a study of how a person’s adoption and active use of social media contributes to 
vulnerability to physical threats, for example being targeted by terrorists or other criminals. 
There are indications of social media having been utilized by ISIS to target Israeli government 
personnel [141]. Furthermore, terrorist use of cyber methods is recognized as a growing threat 
[81]. 
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DESCRIPTIONS OF AND ASSESMENTS ON THE INTERVIEWEES 
Candolin, Catharina 
Dr. Catharina Candolin works currently as the head of the Cyber Defence Sector at the 
Defence Command of the Finnish Defence Forces. Her educational background is in 
Computer Science and Engineering, on which she wrote her dissertation, Securing military 
decision making in a network-centric environment, at Helsinki University of Technology in 
year 2005. She has worked at the Finnish Defence Forces since year 2003, and prior to her 
current position she worked for 5 years as Chief of information management at the Defence 
Command of the Finnish Defence Forces. [7]  
Having studied engineering and worked in the C4 field for nearly a decade, Dr. Candolin can 
be considered an expert in C4 systems that has perspective to the cyber field from information 
and computer systems perspective. She does not, however, have experience in intelligence, 
which can be considered a limitation to her expertise with respect to cyber intelligence. 
Huopio, Kauto 
Kauto Huopio has worked as Chief Specialist at Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority (FICORA) / National Cyber Security Centre Finland (NCSC-FI) since year 2001, 
having an over 13-year experience at his current position. Prior to joining the FICORA he had 
worked for 5 years as senior network engineer. [35]  
With an experience of well over a decade in cyber security and being substantially involved in 
maintaining CERT-FI’s cyber situation awareness, Huopio possesses valuable insight on 
current development of online threats as well as relatively long-term perspective to them. The 
fact that he has been cited in numerous newspaper articles associated with cyber security [34; 
125; 133; 139] suggests that he is considered an authority. He does not, however, have 
personal working experience on intelligence. 
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Hyppönen, Mikko 
Mikko Hyppönen is the Chief Research Officer for F-Secure, having worked for the company 
dince 1991. “Mikko Hypponen has assisted law enforcement authorities in the United States, 
Europe and Asia on cybercrime cases. He has also written for international publications like 
the Scientific American, Foreign Policy, New York Times and virus Bulletin, as well as 
addressing the most important security-related conferences worldwide.” [38] 
Having worked in the field of information security with one of the now leading cyber security 
companies in the world since the public emergence of the Internet, Mikko Hyppönen can be 
assessed to have exceptionally profound insight into cyber security, and it is not surprising 
that he is considered a leading authority in the field. From the perspective of the thesis, 
Hyppönen might possibly have due to his background a critical perception of cyber 
intelligence. 
Kalinen, Riku 
Riku Kalinen works as a specialist at the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. He has 
worked in the field of cyber counterintelligence for 20 years [89] and holds a GIAC Reverse 
Engineering Malware (GREM) certification [43]. Based on his lengthy experience and 
occupation, he can be considered an expert on cyber security threats and furthermore to have 
profound perspective to the field. Due to his place of employment, his point of view is from 
countering cyber intelligence rather than conducting such. 
  
Lieutenant (Navy) Karri Wihersaari’s Master’s Thesis ANNEX 1 
Intelligence Acquisition Methods in Cyber Domain 3 (6) 
Kantola, Harry 
Major Harry Kantola works currently as researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence as well as at the Cyber Defence Sector at the Defence Command of the 
Finnish Defence Forces. His general staff officer’s thesis Datanetvärksattacker, trend eller 
nödvändighet? - ur ett småstatsperspektiv addressed offensive computer networks operations 
from a small state perspective, and he is a co-author of The Fog of Cyber Defence, Countering 
Threatsa Comprehensive Model for Utilization of Social Media for Security and law 
Enforcement Authorities and Modelling Cyber Warfare as a Hierarchic Error Effect of 
Information. [22] 
Judging by his publications and the fact that he is appointed as representative to the CCDCOE 
major Kantola can be considered an expert on cyber warfare. Given that cyber intelligence has 
a substantial offensive element, Kantola’s research can be considered to be valuable to this 
study. 
Kari, Martti 
Colonel Kari works presently as Deputy Director of the Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency 
(FDIA). He has worked at the Finnish Intelligence Research Establishment (FIRE) for half of 
his 3-decade career in the Finnish Defence Forces. [37] He was summoned to the workgroup 
of preparing Guidelines for developing Finnish legislation on conducting intelligence as 
permanent expert member [113].  
Due to his extensive experience in military intelligence, Colonel Kari can be considered to 
have a substantially profound perspective to the field. Furthermore, having been involved 
with writing the recently published Guidelines for developing Finnish legislation on 
conducting intelligence, he can be considered to have insight to the different aspects of cyber 
intelligence. This can to an extent be considered also a limitation, because it might bring bias 
of perceiving the subject from military intelligence perspective. 
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Kiravuo, Timo 
Timo Kiravuo works as researcher at Aalto University, Dept. of Communications and 
Networking (Comnet). He currently works on a doctoral thesis on security aspects of large 
Ethernets. He has a 2-decade experience in the IT field, half of which at Nixu, a prominent 
information security consulting company. [50] Having extensive experience in IT and doing 
research on network security, he can be considered an expert on countering cyber threats. 
However, his insight into the field of  intelligence can perhaps be limited. 
Kärkkäinen, Anssi 
Major (Engineering) Anssi Kärkkäinen is the Chief of Cyber Division at Finnish Defence 
Forces C5 Agency [6]. He has written a thesis by the title A Cyber Security Architecture for 
Military Networks Using a Cognitive Network Approach [100]. Kärkkäinen’s field of 
expertise can be considered cyber security, however his experience in the intelligence 
framework is limited. 
Limnéll, Jarno 
Doctor of Military Sciences (National Defense University), Master of Social Science 
(Helsinki University), Captain (ret.) Jarno Limnéll works as Professor of Cyber Security at 
Aalto University, and he is the VP of Cyber Security and Business Development at Insta 
Group Oy. He has previously worked as Director of Cyber Security at McAfee and Stonesoft. 
His last position in the Finnish Defence Forces was as lecturer at the National Defence 
University. He is the author of Kyberturvallisuus and a co-author of The Fog of Cyber 
Defence. [33] Professor Limnéll can be considered an expert in cyber security. The security 
perspective might, however, limit his perspective to the field of intelligence.  
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Niemelä, Mikko S. 
Mikko Niemelä is the founder, Managing Director and Senior Security Advisor at Silverskin 
Information Security Oy. The subject of his GIAC (GSNA) Gold Certification thesis was 
Choosing corporate level instant messaging system and implementing audit controls. [39] 
Niemelä can be considered an expert with hands-on experience in the field of conducting 
offensive intelligence on private corporations. His close affiliation to Silverskin Oy might 
perhaps be considered to be a source of bias. 
Ottis, Rain 
“Dr Rain Ottis is an Associate Professor in Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia. From 
2008 to 2012 he served as a scientist at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence, where he worked on strategic analysis and concept development in the context of 
national and international cyber security. Prior to that assignment he served as a 
communications officer in the Estonian Defence Forces, focusing primarily on cyber defence 
training and awareness. In addition to his current assignment, he is teaching cyber security in 
University of Jyväskylä, Finland. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy 
(BS, Computer Science) and Tallinn University of Technology (PhD, Computer Science; 
MSc, Informatics). His research interests include cyber conflict, national cyber security, 
politically motivated cyber attacks and the role of volunteers in cyber security.” [11] 
Dr. Ottis has substantial expertise in the field of cyber security, and has also military 
experience. A possible limitation with respect to the thesis might be his security-oriented 
perspective. 
Palokangas, Tero 
Major Tero Palokangas works as a senior staff officer at J3 of the Defence Command of the 
Finnish Defence Forces [48]. He can be considered to bring an operational perspective to the 
examination of cyber intelligence, whereas his experience on intelligence might be a 
limitation. 
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Timonen, Jussi 
First Lieutenant (Engineering) “Jussi Timonen is a Ph.D. Student at the Finnish National 
Defence University and working at the Finnish Defence forces C4 agency. His main research 
areas are information fusion, common operational picture and situational awareness in critical 
infrastructure.“ [138, p. 126] Timonen can be considered to have substantial insight to 
hacking activities and cyber security. His experience on the field of intelligence is perhaps a 
limitation. 
Tuukkanen, Topi 
Commander Tuukkanen works as Research Manager (Cyber) at Finnish Defence Research 
Agency, and he has published the works Adapting the Current National Defence Doctrine to 
Cyber Domain and Cyber Sovereignty [51]. Hence, he can be recognized to have insight into 
cyber warfare. However, his level of practical expertise might be a limitation. 
Rantapelkonen, Jari 
Doctor of Military Sciences, Lieutenant Colonel Jari Rantapelkonen works as Professor at the 
Department of Operational Art and Tactics of the National Defence University. He is the co-
editor of The Fog of Cyber Defence. [122] Professor Rantapelkonen can be recognized as an 
authority in the field of cyber warfare from an Operational Art perspective. However, his 
technical expertise is a limitation from the perspective of the thesis. 
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THEME QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEWS 
1. The definition of intelligence in cyber domain and how it relates to other intelligence 
disciplines. 
• How would you define intelligence in cyber domain? 
• How and by what attributes is cyber intelligence differentiated from other 
intelligence disciplines? 
2. Reach, limits, advantages and disadvantages of intelligence in cyber domain. 
• To what extent can intelligence requirements be met solely through intelligence 
methods in cyber domain? 
• What are the greatest advantages and disadvantages compared to other disciplines? 
• What kind of intelligence can only be acquired through intelligence in cyber domain? 
• What kind of intelligence cannot be acquired? 
3. Intelligence operatives in cyber domain. 
• How would you categorize intelligence operatives in cyber domain? 
• What are their typical objects/motives? 
4. Intelligence methods in cyber domain. 
• How would you categorize different intelligence methods in cyber domain? 
  
5. Criteria for evaluating intelligence methods in cyber domain. 
• What factors would you point out as most enabling / facilitating the use of intelligence 
methods in cyberspace? 
• What factors would you point out as most limiting / restraining the use of intelligence 
methods in cyberspace? 
• What factors would you point out as best determining the quality of intelligence 
methods in cyberspace? 
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COVER LETTER FOR AHP SURVEY 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
Thank you for taking the time to share your views on the topic of intelligence in cyber 
domain, and furthermore thank you for agreeing to submit your assessments to the AHP-
model of cyber intelligence acquisition created for the analysis purposes of the study.  
The following stage of the study is a survey conducted in an online interface of Expert Choice 
Companion Solution. You will receive links to the surveys along with this message.  
One aim of the study is to establish a model of intelligence acquisition in cyber domain, 
categorizing types of acquisition methods and criteria for evaluating the qualities of these 
methods from a given perspective. The model has been established based on existing 
literature and refined based on interviews with experts of the field. The model incorporates 
methods directly contributing to or enabling intelligence acquisition in cyber domain. The 
focus is on acquisition of information, and the aspects of analyzing, synthesizing, 
disseminating and exploiting the acquired intelligence have been excluded.  
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a multi-criteria decision-making approach and was 
introduced by Thomas L. Saaty. It is a decision support tool which can be used to solve 
complex decision problems. It uses a multi-level hierarchical structure of objectives, criteria, 
sub criteria, and alternatives. [135] A schematic illustration of the AHP model is displayed in 
Figure A3.1 below. 
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Figure A3.1 Example of an AHP Hierarchy 
In the AHP model, alternatives are weighed with respect to the set criteria and the criteria are 
weighed appropriately in with respect to each other by giving the assessed items numeric 
values. Further information about the AHP as a method can be found online, for example 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_hierarchy_process and 
https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/bitstream/handle/123456789/15146/isbn9783319125022.pdf. 
In this study, the AHP will be used as a tool to analyze how favorable different intelligence 
acquisition methods are from different operatives’ points of view. The assessment will be 
done with respect to the preconditions of three distinct scenarios: 
1. Finnish criminal organization, operating from Finland.  
• Objective: acquire any information and means exploitable for direct financial revenue. 
2. Hacktivist group from an Arabic-speaking country, operating from the Middle East.  
• Objective: defacing official Finnish government websites and social media accounts 
with propaganda of the group’s ideological agenda. 
3. Non-European foreign nation state, conducting intelligence operations on Finnish 
target organizations and systems. 
• Objective: acquire confidential information about Finnish R&D on online 
communication security technology. 
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The scenarios are coarse rather than detailed. Please try to empathize with the scenario and 
affiliated objectives as well as you can. In the generated AHP model, individual intelligence 
acquisition methods are treated as alternatives of the hierarchy, and they are evaluated based 
on three main criteria (with sub-criteria). The elements of the AHP model are displayed in 
Table A3.1 below. 
Table A3.1 Elements of the AHP Model on Intelligence Acquisition 
Methods in Cyber Domain 
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The assessment will proceed in the following sequence: 
Step 1:  Description of scenario 
Step 2:  Assessment of significance of main evaluating criteria with respect to scenario 
Steps 3-6 : Assessment of significance of sub-criteria with respect to scenario 
Steps 7-22: Assessment of alternatives with respect to criteria 
Step 23: Comments on the survey 
Step 24: End of survey 
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Please pay attention to the fact that three identical surveys have been generated for the set 
scenarios, and therefore the assessment process needs to be carried out three times, once for 
each scenario. When assessing the alternatives, choose a value between 0% and 100% where 
0% stands for poor and 100% stands for outstanding. If you deem the criteria not applicable to 
an alternative, choose the option ‘Not Applicable.’ In case you need to make additional 
presumptions in order to make your assessments, or you have other remarks to make, please 
enter them in the comment field at the end of the survey. If you experience any problems or if 
you have any questions regarding the survey, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Thank you very much for your time and effort! 
With best regards, 
Lieutenant (Navy) Karri Wihersaari 
karri.wihersaari@mil.fi 
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AHP SURVEY 
1 STEP 1 – DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO 
On the start page of the survey, the scenario to be assessed and an overview of the survey are 
depicted. Figure A4.1 depicts the start page of the survey for scenario 1. Start pages of other 
two surveys are identical apart from the scenario description. 
Figure A4.1 Description of the Scenario and Overview of the Survey 
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2 STEPS 2-6 – PRIORITIZING THE MAIN AND SUB-CRITERIA 
In steps 2-6 of the survey, the main and sub-criteria are prioritized in terms of significance 
with respect to the scenario. The legends for the criteria in the survey are as follows: 
• Evaluating criteria: How significant are the main evaluating criteria? Please make 
your assessment with respect to the set scenario: 
1.      Finnish criminal organization, operating from Finland.  
Objective: capture any information and means exploitable for direct financial revenue. 
Evaluating scale 0-1, where 0 stands for not significant, 1 stands for very significant.  
o Performance: Criteria contributing to the the performance of an intelligence 
acquisition method. 
 Speed: By using the method, is intelligence acquired quickly enough? 
 Efficiency: When using the method, to what extent is the time, effort, 
and/or cost well-used? 
 Resolution: Is the resolution of the method appropriate? Does the 
method produce or contribute to producing intelligence in appropriate 
detail? 
 Verifiability: Is the information gathered verifiable using other 
sources? 
 Validity: Is the validity of intelligence collected sufficient? 
 Reliability: Is the reliability of intelligence collected sufficient? 
o Capability: Criteria contributing to the capability of an operative to utilize an 
intelligence method. 
 Technology: Is the operative sufficiently up-to-date and equipped in 
terms of technology with respect to the method? 
 Expertise: Does the operative possess sufficient expertise with respect 
to the method? 
• Technical: Does the operative possess sufficient technical 
expertise with respect to the method? 
• Contextual: Does the operative possess sufficient contextual 
expertise (i.e. expertise required to comprehend the content) 
with respect to the method? 
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 Resources: Does the operative have sufficient resources (funds, 
personnel) in order to utilize the method? 
 Leadership: Is the operative capable of effectively directing the use of 
the method? 
 Support from other INTEL: Is the operative capable of supporting 
the method by other information sources? 
o Risk: Criteria contributing to the risks involved in utilizing an intelligence 
method. 
 Jurisdiction: To what extent is the method utilizable by the operative 
with respect to jurisdiction? How well is the method utilizable within 
legal constraints? 
 Exposure of operative: How preferable is the method with respect to 
risking the operative being identified? 
 Exposure of method: How preferable is the method with respect to 
risking the method used being identified? 
 Exposure of target: How preferable is the method with respect to 
risking the target noticing the intelligence efforts? 
Figures A4.2–6 depict the survey pages for prioritizing the criteria. 
Figure A4.2 Weighing the Main Criteria 
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Figure A4.3 Weighing the Sub-criteria of Performance 
Figure A4.4 Weighing the Sub-criteria of Capability
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Figure A4.5 Weighing the Sub-criteria of Expertise 
Figure A4.6 Prioritizing Sub-criteria of Risk 
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3 STEPS 7-22 – ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES WITH RESPECT 
TO CRITERIA 
In steps 7-22 of the survey, the alternatives are assessed against each sub-criteria with respect 
to the scenario. The legends for the alternatives in the survey are as follows: 
• Cyber-OSINT: The collection and utilization of open source and publicly available 
information available through cyber domain.
• Scanning and enumeration in public domain: Scanning and enumeration of target 
system(s) in public environments.
• Scanning and enumeration in restricted domain: Scanning and enumeration of 
target system(s) in environments of restricted access (for example after breaking in to 
a closed network).
• Intrusion: Breaking into a restricted system.
• Exploiting privileged information: Utilization of information available in a 
restricted system or network.
• Exfiltration of data: To extract data found in a restricted system or network.
• Obfuscation: Erasing traces of unsanctioned activities in a system.
• Sustaining access: Establishing bridgehead and creating new points of entry into a 
target system.
• Network mapping: Investigating the topology and infrastructure composition of a 
system.
• Social engineering: Exploiting human-originated vulnerabilities through technical 
and/or social interaction.
• Physical surveillance: Exploiting sensors available on computers, mobile phones etc. 
in order to gain intelligence on activities or whereabouts of an object.
• Network surveillance: Surveillance and interception of network traffic.
• Malware: Targeted or non-targeted utilization of malware in order to gain access to or 
collect information from a closed system.
• Physical attack: Accessing a target system on-site or introducing malicious hardware 
to the target system.
• Alterations in the supply chain: Altering hardware and/or software before delivery 
to the end-user in order to gain access to and/or collect confidential information.
Figure A4.7 depicts the first survey page for assessing the alternatives. 
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Figure A4.7 Evaluating Alternatives Against Speed 
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4 STEPS 23–24 – COMMENTS ON THE SURVEY AND END OF THE 
SURVEY 
After the survey, the contributor is allowed to submit remarks on the survey. The comment 
input page is depicted in Figure A4.8. The end page of the survey is depicted in Figure A4.9. 
Figure A4.8 Comment Page 
Figure A4.9 End Page of the Survey 
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RESPONSES TO AHP-SURVEY 
The survey was conducted in three parts identical in all respects except the framework 
scenarios. Out of 14 persons requested, 4 responded in full. 5 persons submitted partial 
assessments, which have been omitted from the presented results. Two participants assessed 
some of the items not applicable (NA) for performance measures of alternatives with respect 
to the assessment criteria in question. The assessments have been anonymized, with each 
participant number consistently referring to participants. Survey results are presented in 
Tables A5.1 and A5.2:
Table A5.1 Unnormalized Criteria Weights Submitted to Scenarios 1–3 
    Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Parent criteria 
assessed against 
Prioritized sub-criteria 
Participant Participant Participant 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Main criteria 
Performance 0.76 0.50 0.44 0.70 0.49 0.79 0.90 1.00 0.77 0.86 0.86 0.72
Capability 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.60 0.44 0.79 0.52 0.70 0.90 0.84 0.86 0.85
Risk 0.50 0.81 0.84 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.84
Performance 
Speed 1.00 0.30 0.84 0.60 0.15 0.20 0.75 0.81 0.96 0.03 0.45 0.45
Efficiency 0.85 0.50 0.64 0.80 0.87 0.09 0.87 0.77 1.00 0.72 0.49 0.79
Resolution 0.71 0.20 0.69 0.40 0.10 0.09 0.86 0.63 0.80 0.55 0.55 0.31
Verifiability 0.46 0.22 0.33 0.60 0.10 0.16 0.79 0.55 0.16 0.86 0.80 0.27
Validity 0.44 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.16 0.08 0.82 0.73 0.89 0.74 0.86 0.72
Reliability 1.00 0.16 0.58 0.50 0.30 0.14 0.87 0.59 0.55 0.78 0.83 0.53
Capability 
Technology 0.85 0.30 0.85 0.80 0.85 0.96 0.94 0.79 0.93 0.80 0.94 0.85
Expertise 1.00 0.47 0.53 0.80 0.90 0.88 0.95 0.77 0.77 0.94 0.87 0.77
Resources 0.62 0.20 0.69 0.60 0.10 0.60 0.89 0.46 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.77
Leadership 1.00 0.10 0.45 0.80 0.44 0.46 0.80 0.61 0.89 0.92 0.84 0.68
Support from other INTEL 0.82 0.03 0.33 0.30 0.10 0.03 0.80 0.30 0.72 0.54 0.55 0.33
Expertise 
Technical 1.00 0.89 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.92 0.99 0.76 1.00 0.86 0.85 0.67
Contextual 1.00 0.20 0.34 0.70 0.91 0.25 0.91 0.65 1.00 0.86 0.84 0.78
Risk 
Jurisdiction 0.77 0.01 0.71 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.91 0.12 0.80 0.81 0.95 0.48
Exposure of operative 0.36 0.74 0.63 0.86 0.10 0.50 0.91 0.53 0.92 0.73 0.83 0.78
Exposure of method 0.42 0.65 0.51 0.60 0.52 0.25 0.80 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.87 0.80
Exposure of target 0.48 0.67 0.52 0.46 0.10 0.50 0.87 0.43 0.91 0.66 0.85 0.47
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Table A5.2 Method Assessments Submitted to Scenarios 1–3 
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RESULTS OF AHP SURVEY 
The computed priorities of the cyber intelligence acquisition methods and normalized local 
and global weights of the assessment criteria are presented in Tables A6.1–3. In calculating 
the values, data points deemed ‘Not Applicable’ by the participant were excluded from the 
data grid.  The data is presented in Ideal Mode, meaning that it “preserves rank by dividing 
the score of each alternative only by the score of the best alternative under each 
criterion,”[107] and unnormalized, meaning that “the priority is the sum of the products of 
each covering objective's global priority times the priority of the alternative with respect to 
each covering objective” [8]: 
 


Where : 
 = Total priority 
 =  number of objective 
  Ratio score for the alternative on the ith objective 
  Global priority score for the the ith objective  
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Table A6.1 Criteria Weights and Method Priorities for Scenario 1 
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